THE MIND IN ACTION

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THE RECONSTRUCTION OF MIND

By ESMÉ WINGFIELD-STRATFORD,
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THE MIND IN ACTION

A STUDY OF HUMAN INTERESTS

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BY
GEORGE H. GREEN

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PREFACE

THIS book deals with the dynamic conception of mind.

Nowhere in the book is it called that. Some years ago Huxley said that science is "organised common sense." Unlike many of the men who lived in his own day and many who have lived since, he was capable of saying what he knew in common, everyday speech.

Since then, Blatchford has maintained that the man who cannot state his knowledge so that his neighbour in the railway carriage understands him does not know the subject too well himself. What you cannot explain in everyday language you do not know.

I have tried to use none but common, everyday words throughout this book. Consequently I have nowhere spoken of the dynamic conception of mind. I have found it possible to speak more simply.

I have never understood why I should not talk of the human mind in exactly the same way that I should talk of dinners and theatres, of newspapers and tobacco. At all times and in all places men talk of the things that interest them, and are of importance to them, in words that need no great effort to understand.

I believe very strongly that there should be a

general knowledge of modern knowledge; that the general public should know what the universities and the schools and the specialists are doing and thinking and saying. This is nearly as important as it is that the universities and the schools and the specialists should know what the public are doing and thinking and saying.

When a man treats a subject ponderously and heavily, it is often because he finds it hard to convince himself that the subject itself is a serious and important one. He believes that he has to make it seem serious and ponderous by his treatment of it. In very much the same way, a man who is not quite sure that he is a gentleman takes great pains with his dress and manners, in order to feel like one.

If I have treated the subject lightly, or appeared to do so, it is not because I do not realise that it is serious and important. I realise that it has these qualities because of what it is. Its value and importance do not in the least depend upon my treatment of it.

The idea of the book has grown up out of a lecture I gave some time ago to an audience, made up of equal parts of "intellectuals" and publicity men. The latter were so keen, and their questions were so pertinent, that I was much impressed.

One of them, summing up their general attitude, said to me at the close, "I have been doing these things all my life, and have been quite successful. But I never understood before why I did them."

In a lecture it is possible to cover only a small part of the field. I made up my mind that, so

soon as an opportunity could be made, I would endeavour to cover much more ground.

This book is the result.

I have written it to convey to men and women such as I meet every day the outlines of modern views of the human mind.

I believe that these views are of use, and that they are of importance for the ordinary man. I have not written for those who are more than ordinary—nor can I. The asylums are already full of people who know that they are more than ordinary. Many more who believe themselves such are on the way.

These are some of the reasons why I have written this book.

There are, of course, others. But they are personal. There is no need to speak of them here.

G. H. G.

London, 1922.

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Chapter I

TWO KINDS OF ADVERTISING

THERE is a good deal of talk nowadays about "creating interest."

"Creating" means making, and, speaking strictly, making something out of nothing. So that the man who creates interest really makes interest out of nothing.

When the matter is stated in this way, very few people will claim to have created interest. We see at once that the most we can claim to have done is to have directed an interest that already exists into a new direction.

Civilisation grows and expands because we find it possible to direct interest in ways that it has never before been directed. If for a while our interest goes out in directions that in the end seem worthless, so that we withdraw it in order to direct it anew in other ways, yet we are the richer for the experience that we have gained.

There are many ways in which we can attempt a study of interest. We may study our own experiences, so that we may know them as well as live them. But there is always the difficulty that few of us are able to look at ourselves fairly.

We do not as a rule, when a man applies for a

post, ask him to write his own testimonials. We believe that our own estimate of the man, or that of his former employer, will be a fairer one than that which he will give of himself.

So that, although it is possible to study interest in this way, we shall expect that very few men can give us accounts of themselves on which either we or themselves may confidently rely.

One valuable means of gaining information about the way in which interest works is to study the methods of those men who are endeavouring to direct the interest of great numbers of men into certain definite directions . . . the methods of the advertiser and the publicist.

The great advertisers are the people who have succeeded in attracting the interest of large numbers of consumers to themselves and their products.

There is, for instance, a certain demand for soap. This demand may increase, as people develop the habit of using more and more soap and as new markets are opened up. In the end, however, there is a limit. The efforts of advertisers will be directed therefore to capturing the whole of that demand or as great a portion of it as possible. The advertiser who cannot capture a reasonable share of that demand will have to go out of business.

The demand for soap is the measure of the interest in soap.

The advertiser has to direct this interest, so that the interest in soap becomes an interest in the particular soap that he sells.

In doing this, he has created nothing. He has

simply directed for his own purposes an interest that already existed.

In general, our interest is not linked on to any very exact knowledge. The majority of people do not, for instance, buy certain soap because it is the very best soap that can be bought, consisting of the very best ingredients united by the very best processes in the very best proportions. An expert specialist might do so; but hardly the average man.

In one particular direction we may be experts, but in practically all others we are average men—members of great crowds, not distinguished very markedly from other members.

All advertisers seem to recognise this distinction. As a result, the boot manufacturer who is trying to sell a certain line of boots to a factor proceeds on quite different lines from those on which the retailer works when he is trying to sell the same boots to a customer. This is because selling a pair of shoes to an expert and selling a pair to a woman who believes that she has a narrow foot are very different propositions.

What is said in the first instance depends upon what you know of the goods. What is said in the second depends upon what you know of the customer.

The distinction is a very important one, since we are all, so soon as we leave our own narrow groove, members of crowds. The financier buying stocks and the financier choosing gloves are moved differently. The ship's captain choosing perfumes, the lady scientist trying to decide on an evening's

amusement, are exactly like the rest of us would be in a similar situation. The former, purchasing a yacht, or the latter, deciding upon a book, will act as experts, guided by special knowledge. But when they are not acting as experts, they are moved by impulses that are common to mankind. They become, for the time being, members of a crowd.

About all this there may be very little that is new. Advertisers have recognised it, if not by what they have said, by their practice.

Public men have also made the same distinction. So that the Chancellor of the Exchequer,[1] for example, speaks very differently when he is addressing a meeting of business men in the City and a mass meeting of his constituents.

But although the distinction has been made, it has been made very little of in the books that attempt to link up "psychology" and "business." The attempt to link the two cannot be successful unless the "psychology" really throws light upon the "reason why" of the things that are done by those who are attempting to influence the public.

Unless such an understanding is arrived at, so that the business man knows why he does certain things, he will be limited to two possible lines of working.

He may copy methods that have proved successful in the past. But he should know that a success cannot be repeated. A slogan, for example, that has been used with success in connection with one commodity, has lost all its freshness and force, as

[1] The reference here is quite general and does not refer to the present holder of this office.

well as its quality of uniqueness, by the time that it is adopted for another.

In the second place, he may proceed, as is still the custom, by a process of "trial and error." He may launch out upon an advertising campaign, spending a good deal of money upon it. If it proves successful, then he continues. If it promises failure, he develops it in ways that seem likely to make it into a success, or he withdraws.

In either case, advertising is a very "risky" matter.

Sometimes a successful advertiser or publicist makes an attempt to tell us how the thing is done. He attempts to give us the rules of success.

It soon becomes clear, as we attempt to follow his explanations, that there are no rules—unless we accept as rules the conditions of all success—understanding and hard work. In general, we are merely given a number of methods that have in the past led to good results.

One "rule" that is continually given is that an appeal to the public must be a striking one. It should "hit the public in the eye." But such appeals are continually failing. Not every striking thing directs a man's attention to itself. It makes him turn away. Anyone who has followed modern advertising at all will recall at once a number of striking posters that were soon withdrawn because, in spite of their striking qualities, they were not good advertisements from a sales point of view.

Another rule is that the advertisement must be novel. The public is regarded as an animal that has an overmastering craving for novelty. But

there are in existence old-established firms, who make no endeavour to attract attention by novelty. They were novel when they started, but so were all their dead and forgotten contemporaries. More new firms than old ones come to grief in a year: novelty does not save them.

Then again, one hears much of the value of beautiful and artistic advertising. Less, it is true, from business men than from the artists and printers, who hope in the long run to sell posters which they have designed or produced. It is probably true that an artistic poster will draw the attention of large sections of the public to the poster. But the advertiser is more concerned to draw this attention to the commodity.

There is of course some truth expressed in all these rules. A poster that is striking, novel and artistic will certainly be of greater value than one which is flat and stale and ugly. But the fact remains that an advertisement may obey all these rules, AND YET FAIL.

Again, people often speak of compelling attention. Well, a loud piano-organ beneath your window may compel your attention, but the result is not in the least that which the musician desires. You shut your window, or tell the man to move off. A persistent book-agent compels your attention, and you tell him to go. Compelling people's attention is not always wise. It is rather like shutting your eyes and pulling a trigger and hoping for the best.

It is very clear that none of these rules goes to the heart of the matter. It is clear that if the

principle underlying the advertisement be sound, then striking quality, novelty and beauty will help. They assist an appeal, but they do not make the appeal.

Directing interest is rather like bringing water to your garden. If you know where there is a supply to which you have access, the matter is not difficult.

You will not be wise to rely upon the striking character of the means you use or their novelty. Their artistic appearance will not, of itself, help a great deal.

The main thing that you will have to consider will be THE LAWS ACCORDING TO WHICH WATER FLOWS. If the system you adopt is in accordance with these, then the water will come to your garden. You may make the system better by employing the most up-to-date devices. You may find pleasure in showing your neighbours and friends the striking things about the system. You may find the appearance of the garden enhanced by the beauty of the installation. BUT YOU WILL NOT BE FOOLISH ENOUGH TO SUPPOSE THAT THE WATER COMES TO YOUR GARDEN BECAUSE OF THESE THINGS.

Nor will you be foolish enough to believe, because the water comes to your garden, THAT YOU HAVE CREATED THE WATER.

The business of those who are concerned with advertising, or with other forms of publicity, is to direct the interest from the place where it is, in human beings, to the place where it is wanted.

If we tap a great reservoir of water and draw from it a big supply, we may, in so doing, dry up

a dozen tiny rills that flowed in other directions. And something of the same sort is done by all successful advertising. The interest in biscuits, for instance, that goes now towards Smith's, now towards Brown's, is to be directed constantly towards Jones's biscuits.

And so the problem of all publicity seems to be, not the creation of an interest, but the direction of an already existing and strong interest into a new channel. And before this can be done successfully, there is need to know the nature of interest, the directions in which it flows as a rule, and the laws according to which it flows.

The expert already indicates, by the fact of his being such, a direction in which he has a strong interest. It is, too, a well-defined interest, very different in its nature from the vague, general interest of men who are not experts. It is so well defined that it is possible to make definite appeals to it. When, however, an interest is vague, it is still possible to make well-defined appeals to it, but it is much more difficult to discover the interest and to understand it. But until this is done, no definite appeal can be framed.

The problem of interest is not only of importance to the man who makes publicity his business. It concerns us all directly. For happiness and success in life depend upon the way in which our own personal interest is directed to things in the outside world—to which things and to what extent.

Quite lately, much attention has been directed to the subject of psychoanalysis. Psychoanalysis is a medical technique, discovered by Freud and per-

fected by himself and a small group of physicians and psychologists. As a medical matter, it has no importance for the ordinary man. But it has shown itself to be a great deal more than this.

In essence, it has shown itself to be the study of interest and its laws. It has shown that anxiety and worry, as well as serious "nervous" diseases, are all closely connected with the direction of interest—with the unwise direction of interest, either in the wrong ways or to the wrong objects. And this aspect of the subject is well worth study, as being of great and immediate importance to all of us. It is quite possible to understand some of its most important conclusions, without the use of technical words, or without reading accounts of morbid cases, that are of value only to the physician or the professional psychologist.

The ordinary man, and the business man in particular, is likely to find the study of interest well worth while. Our own interests make up our lives. Our business or profession depends upon the interests of other people. The understanding of interest is at the moment the most important of all problems connected with the understanding of mind, for though interest is not the whole of the mind, it acts as the motor which drives the whole of the mind and which makes us act in certain ways rather than in others. Interest underlies every action and every thought. The knowledge of interest promises to prove a key to human life, mental and physical.

Chapter II

HUMAN INSTINCTS

ATTEMPT to study any activity of any man. Try to discover exactly why he acts in the way he acts, and in no other. At some point in your enquiry you will find that the only answer you can give is: Because he wants to do it.

You may be able to give this answer immediately. You may find that the man has a job which fits him and which he fits. And so you are able to say without hesitation that he does the work he is doing because he is interested in it.

You may measure a man's interest in a thing by discovering what he is prepared to give up on account of it. When a man makes use of the least excuse for absence from his work, when he works with an eye on the clock, when his thoughts wander from his task to other matters—then you may know that his interest in his work is small. But when, on the other hand, he excuses himself from social engagements and games on the ground of his work, when he is prepared to sacrifice comfort and pleasure and money in order to have more time at his work, then you may know that his interest is great and strong.

Sometimes, however, we discover a strong interest that is not immediate in character like that which has been considered above.

Men are interested in their work, not for the sake of the work itself, but very often because work means for them money or distinction or success. It is in these things that they are directly interested, and work appeals to them only because it is a means to these ends.

Whenever we deal with the career of a successful man, we shall find one strong, deep interest that drives life on to a single purpose. And with this strong single interest goes decision. Indecision is a mark of divided interests; as if a man were attempting to serve two masters, and were at a loss to know what to do in order to please both.

Indifference is a mark of lack of interest. We cannot imagine a man without interest. But in the case of the man who is indifferent the interest is not directed towards the things that interest most people. Later, we shall have to consider where the interest really is directed.

Very few people show the capacity in later life for being absorbed in the way that was frequent with them when they were children. It is rare to find an adult interested in any single object to the same extent as is a child in a new toy, or a parcel containing something for him.

The child examines the fastening. He attempts to untie the knot. If this happens to be beyond his powers, he takes it to the nearest adult, and says, "Please untie this knot." And as soon as the adult has done what is necessary, and no more, the child

wants to take back the parcel, and to go on with the matter for himself.

Absorption is easier for children, since they have so few interests. The majority of adults, on the other hand, fritter away their interest in many directions, as a river may divide itself up into a thousand paltry trickles. Some interests pull in opposite directions to others, and as a result the adult, though he may have as great a reserve of interest as the child, may achieve no sort of result whatever.

A great many men have taken up their present occupation for reasons which are certainly not the right ones. Circumstances may have decided them. Their parents may have chosen for them. They may have believed it to be something other than what it has proved to be.

The net result is that they are not able to direct their interest to their business. They perform all their tasks indifferently, caring very little whether they do them or not. Their real interest is somewhere else all the time. It may be in pleasure or in a hobby.

The ideal reason for choosing and remaining in an occupation is that only through that occupation can interest find expression. Our society will have to develop a great deal before this ideal course is open to all men; but it seems certain, that if men understood their own interest better, they would discover the possibilities that lie hidden from them in the jobs at which they are actually working.

Occasionally we do find a man in a post that he "fits" and that "fits" him. Then we find that

there is the same absorption in the immediate task that there was in the case of the child with its parcel. And when the immediate task is finished, there is the eagerness for another, also connected with the larger interest.

As time goes on, a body of knowledge accumulates, all connected with the work. Very little is forgotten, for it is well recognised that memory for a fact depends upon the interest which that fact possesses for the person who has to remember.

We are inclined to say of a man who possesses at the same time this marked keenness for his work, expert knowledge and infallible memory for details connected with it, that he has an "instinct" for his business.

We mean, when we speak of an "instinct" in this way, that the business itself or one of the many tasks that arise out of it is able to call forth the man's skill, knowledge and interest. That he is able to become absorbed in his work at any time, and to disregard the existence of anything else.

The naturalist does not use the word "instinct" in quite the same way. When he uses the word—as he does when he speaks of the duck's instinct to swim, the eagle's instinct to hunt prey, the chick's instinct to peck—he means a complicated action that the animal is able to perform efficiently, without either practice or instruction.

Thus, if a brood of ducklings is hatched by a hen, and the young birds are taken near the water by their foster-mother, they will ignore all her warnings and scoldings, run to the water and begin to swim. There may be no other birds on the water

to suggest swimming to them, it may be the first occasion on which they have seen water other than that which is placed in small vessels for them to drink. It is impossible that they can have received instruction in swimming from the hen.

Here, then, is an instance of a capacity, which the duckling possessed at birth, and which it was able to use so soon as the opportunity presented itself. It owes nothing to any instruction or knowledge in the first instance, though it is capable of improvement with practice. With it, too, there is bound up a great interest. The instinct to swim in the case of the duckling is linked on to a great interest in all that is connected with swimming—with a great interest in water. As a result, so soon as water is seen, the duckling's interest in the foster-mother and her warnings and cries of distress is of no account in comparison with the overwhelming interest in water.

The modern psychologist believes that, if we examine sufficiently closely human behaviour, we shall find evidence for the existence of instincts that have these characteristics. We shall find capacities, that are used so soon as opportunities present themselves; capacities that exist apart from learning or experience, though they can be improved by practice, and changed very considerably as a result of knowledge and experience.

We do not attempt to discover these instincts merely because the search for them is interesting, or because we wish to build up a body of knowledge. It is because we believe that all our interest is linked up with these instincts, and that we must

discover them if we are to discover the sources of interest in our lives, that the search appears to possess practical value.

Is it possible to discover in ourselves capacities that we possessed at birth, quite apart from any experience? Capacities that we believe that we should have made use of, even without instruction?

The task is a little difficult, since we have all received so much instruction and training. Every adult has gained, too, a great deal of experience. So that whatever his capacities may have been in the first place, his actions are very complicated indeed. It is only by comparing the activities of a great many adults whose training and experience have been very different in character that we can get any idea of the capacity that underlies all the activities; that something which is the same in all these very different things.

The results that we get must be carefully compared with what observers of very young children are able to tell us. In babies we should be able to observe the simplest expressions of instincts—that is, if such really exist in human beings.

We should be able to see the simplest ways of expressing what adults express in much more complicated and efficient ways.

At this point it will be sufficient to say that psychologists assure us that they have been able to discover a few simple instincts at work in simple ways in infants, and in much more complicated ways in adults. The adult finds that it is wise to alter his behaviour from that of the baby, and this he

does in ways that are the result of his experience, and of his thoughts about his experience.

In connection with instincts we have desire and craving. The sight of an opportunity—very often the mere idea of an opportunity—makes us feel the unrest that we call by these names. Desire or craving drives us towards action, giving us unpleasant feelings that will increase in intensity and unpleasantness until we act in the appropriate way.

This state of feeling is exactly that which the advertiser or the publicist wishes to bring about in the person to whom he appeals. He wishes to arouse desire, that will not be appeased until the man has acted in the way that the advertiser wishes him to act. But as there is a great deal of reason to believe that desire is only found in connection with an appeal to an instinct, it is clear that no systematic appeals of this kind can be made until some knowledge of the instincts has been acquired.

It would seem, in the present state of our knowledge about interest, that each of us has a more or less definite stock of it, that is, as it were, our mental capital. This interest can only find its way into the outer world by way of our instincts.

So that, if we regard our interest as being contained in some reservoir within us, we must look upon the instincts as a number of outlets from this reservoir.

If we grasp this conception, it is possible to form some image of the ways in which mind works.

In the outer world, an opportunity offers itself. Interest flows into the nervous system just as

electricity flows into a series of insulated wires, conveying messages to the muscles that must act if the opportunity is to be used. Not merely to these, but also to parts of the body that must nourish these muscles. In exactly the same way, when a battle has to be fought, we do not merely stir up the infantry, but also the commissariat, the medical, the engineering and the transport corps.

Our brains and nervous systems may be compared to a system of insulated wires, to a system of channels or roads. These are of no value in themselves, but they permit the passage of electricity or water or traffic from the place where it is to the place where it is wanted. Interest shows itself in a series of impulses passing along the nervous system to the muscles which are to carry out the appropriate action which is the expression of interest and the satisfaction of desire.

It is only lately that psychologists have begun definitely to recognise instincts in human beings. It was formerly the custom to believe that animals acted because of instincts, but men because of reason.

The view has changed, because it has been increasingly recognised that there exist, as the foundation of all human behaviour, a number of capacities which are independent of experience and learning. These are so perfect, naturally, that they can begin to work effectively so soon as opportunity offers itself.

With the presence of opportunity, DESIRE shows itself. The child feels desire, and hastens to take advantage of it. He shows eagerness. He finds

PLEASURE as his efforts carry him forward. He shows ANGER if anyone tries to hold him back.

Further, so soon as the activity is completed, there is a feeling of relief. In effect, the child says, "This is exactly that I have wanted to do for a long time, though I never knew before exactly what it was that I wanted. I am glad that I have done it." And at the same time he realises that this relief is a new experience, that has in some way made him more complete than he was before. If he is old enough to think about the matter, he understands from this feeling of relief that there has existed for some time within him a craving, that he felt as a mild uneasiness, without knowing exactly why. He did not even know that it was there until its removal enabled him to realise its former presence.

The attempt to study interest has already led us back to the instincts—that is, to the very fountain heads. It is necessary to go back so far as this, not merely in the theoretical study, but in the attempt to divert interest and to direct it in the channels in which we wish it to flow. The practical man often finds it necessary to tap interest at its very sources.

This is the reason why it seems well worth while for the practical man to understand what modern psychology has to say of the simple instincts of man.

And if all this should seem very theoretical and unpractical, it can only be said that it is a necessary preliminary to the consideration of matters that are very much otherwise.

Chapter III

SOME IMPORTANT INSTINCTS

AN important human instinct is that of hunger.

The person who first gave the advice "Feed the brute" to the woman who wished to know how to manage a husband recognised this. She realised that interest can be controlled at its sources more easily than at any other point.

The advice is inadequate, because hunger is by no means the only instinct. There are others. The woman who appeals only to the hunger instinct allows a good deal of her husband's interest to flow in other directions.

A fraction only of his interest is bound up with hunger.

Hunger shows its presence in ourselves, whether as adults or as infants, in an uneasiness that grows into a craving. If the work we are doing at the moment is absorbing, we hardly notice it at all until at last we put the work aside. Then the thought of food or the actual presence of food makes us experience desire. Desire leads on to appropriate activity. It is generally admitted that a hungry man enjoys food in a way that no man, eating because it is his regular hour to eat, can hope to do. "Hunger is the best sauce."

So far, then, hunger appears to be an instinct, as we considered instincts in the previous chapter. There is still another point, however. We have said that in connection with an instinct there is present a capacity which is developed naturally, independently of learning or experience.

To the satisfaction of the hunger of a modern man there go a great many things that have not been acquired without a great deal of learning and experience. The things that he wants about him on the table—cutlery, napery, glass and china are all things that he has learned to want. His use of knife and fork and spoon, of a napkin, has also been learned. His preference for cooked food over raw, the order in which he prefers the dishes to appear, are things that he has learned.

In the long run all these preferences and demands appear natural. But they are artificial. A man of a different social class, or of different race or nationality, would have been taught a different set of preferences and demands; and would look upon these as natural, regarding the other man's acquirements as artificial and unnecessary.

But although we bring so much of the results of learning and experience to the gratification of hunger, the whole rests upon a basis that is simple and natural. We are born with the capacity for gratifying hunger. We are born with the capacity for feeling the unrest and the desire that is felt before feeding, with the organs that can act in ways that satisfy our hunger, and with the capacity of directing interest towards the gratification of hunger.

The child is able to grab things and to suck them after conveying them to his mouth, as naturally as the chick pecks or the duckling swims. Later, when he develops teeth, he knows how to use these without any education in the matter.

An instinct is only the beginning of human actions. We believe that every single action we do has its origin in an instinct. But the beginning of a thing is not the whole of it.

The foundations of a skyscraper are not the whole building. An instinct is not the whole of an action. A set of instincts is not the whole of human life and conduct. They are the mere groundwork, upon which life and conduct must be founded and from which these must be built up.

When we observe the actions of an animal, we are able to see the instinct at work. When we watch the actions of men, the instinct has been so overlaid by the results of thought, training, and experience that it can only seldom be discerned. It is none the less important, none the less essential, for this.

The story of the growth from instinct to cultivated activity is the story of individual human development.

Another human instinct that is of great importance is the "instinct of self-assertion." The child has the capacity for crying with a loud voice and for beating the air with his fists at or soon after birth. The platform orator does precisely the same things. The object is in both cases to attract attention to oneself. The baby needs the attention in order to preserve its life. The instinct is

one of the group of self-preservative instincts. The orator needs the attention to preserve his reputation or his cause or his party. Perhaps, if he is a paid orator, to preserve his life, also. But the orator does not MERELY beat the air with his fists, and shout loudly. He uses intelligible words, he may even employ arguments. The simple instinct has been overlaid with a number of results of training, and thought and experience.

It is worth while insisting at this point that with each of these instincts, as with all others, there is bound up a great deal of interest. The fact that there are such instincts as hunger and self-assertion keeps men on the alert for opportunities of gratifying hunger and for asserting themselves. The man who is very hungry notices restaurants a great deal, and outfitters' shops hardly at all. The hungry child gazes through the windows of pastrycooks' shops, and ignores for the time being the toyshops. Interest directs the attention.

Here we have a clue, which must be followed up in due course, to the reason why some forms of publicity attract very little attention, whilst others are overwhelmingly successful.

Interest stirring in us and unable to find an outlet creates uneasiness, whose cause we seldom know. More urgently, we feel it as desire, and then we know, more or less definitely, what it is that we want. We may not see the opportunity; we may only picture it in our minds. But when craving and desire become insupportable, men create opportunities. They see opportunities where they would not have seen them on occasions less urgent.

Children who are ignored persistently do the most extraordinary things in order to compel the attention of grown-up people.

Do you imagine that your child persists in asking you questions when you are busy with the evening paper because it wants information ?

The hatred of being ignored, of being regarded as unimportant, is a development of this simple instinct of self-assertion. The desire for recognition, for admiration, for power and importance is another development ; which leads men to accumulate property, to seek honours, to earn reputations, to aim at high achievements. The most worthy and the most ignoble actions are founded on this simple instinct.

The instinct to make and to construct things is of very great importance. As a rule, we take the child in hand at a very early age, and teach it to make things. If this were not done, the child would still be able to go some distance, though probably a short one only, on his own initiative. But he would not learn, in the course of his life, to build houses and construct ships and machinery, without definite instruction from those who have made progress in these arts. He may, when he has benefited by the experience of all other men of his time, go beyond what any of these have accomplished.

There is all the difference in the world in making a thing yourself from start to finish, according to your own wishes, and in making a tiny part of something, and according to someone else's wishes. The use of machinery has stimulated production, and has conferred many benefits on men, but it

has undoubtedly in many cases made it impossible for the workman to feel interest in his work. This is one of the main problems of industry at the present moment: How can work be arranged so that the workman is able to find the maximum possible interest in it?

The constructive or creative interest makes us demand a result for our labour.

The man who minds a machine that cuts up wood for making furniture cannot get the same enjoyment out of his work that Chippendale could get when he had finished a beautiful chair.

Men and women fly to narcotics and to amusements because their work does not satisfy their cravings. They try to forget the real world of work altogether because they find no opportunities in it. They day-dream of the opportunities that they have not found.

THE MAN WHO WORKS ONLY BECAUSE HE MUST IS INEVITABLY INEFFICIENT—either wholly or in part. The best men do not measure their work by the number of hours they work or the wages they earn, but by the satisfaction they get out of it.

The modern use of team-work is an endeavour to restore possibilities of interest to labour. The men between them and in sight of each other carry out a job, and share in the satisfaction of the finished result.

There is also the instinct to find a mate, that is expressed negatively in the dislike of being alone. It is expressed positively in the interest that people of all ages feel in possessing companions, and in particular an intimate and preferred companion.

This latter differs at different times. It may be, as with the infant, an older companion—the father or the mother. It may be a purely imaginary companion, as we find in the case of children from three to five years of age, and sometimes in people much older. It may be another boy or girl. It may be, as maturity is reached, a companion of the opposite sex. In connection with the latter a "sex instinct" is sometimes spoken of. But this is a complex matter, and is by no means so simple as the instincts we have been considering.

It is, of course, in connection with the later developments of this instinct that it works together with the instinct of construction—the creative instinct—so that the creation of children becomes possible. Hence the "instinct of reproduction" is to be regarded as a complex thing, different from the simple instincts that we are considering.

It is possible that the "instinct of curiosity" is simple in its nature. We feel it as a desire to know, and as a dislike of being ignorant. It is a very important instinct, and plays a very great part in human activities.

These are perhaps not the whole of the human instincts. But it is by no means easy to discover them all, or to be certain that we have reached the foundations of human character at any time. At this moment, psychologists disagree a great deal about the matter. Even if what has been said is not final, it is not misleading. And it "works," in that it makes possible some understanding of human activities. It has the merit of being simple and clear.

It is important to know with certainty some at least of the instincts, since any appeal to one of them is certain to arouse interest.

When the dinner gong sounds while you are making a speech, you know that you may as well end your speech at once. All the interest that was directed towards you is now flowing in another direction altogether.

The problem of publicity is that of arousing interest, draining it from the directions in which it is flowing, and making it flow where you wish it.

There must be an appeal to a strong instinct. It is worth while, then, to know something about the instincts.

Chapter IV

FROM INSTINCT TO ACTION

HOW is the great gap to be bridged that lies between the simple activities that have been described when instincts were being discussed and the everyday actions of men ?

The one is simple, the other complex. But in every department of life we see the simple thing growing into the complicated thing. The rural railway station becomes an important junction. The shop becomes a modern department store. The passenger boat becomes a giant liner. These are familiar developments.

A man's daily life is a very complex thing, compared with that of a wild animal or a child. Yet the child contains within himself, as yet undeveloped, the possibilities of the man. A person of insight, who knew something of the shop, and possessed imagination, foresaw the store.

A person of sufficient imagination, knowing the child, might foresee the man.

Children seldom have the good fortune to fall into the hands of the people with imagination.

Man and child are related as promise and fulfilment—as bud and blossom. No gardening, however skilful, can do more than develop the flower.

No gardener creates. No gardener gives to the flower something that was not already there.

No education can give to a child something that it has not. A good educator, like a good gardener, aims only at bringing to perfection, to complete fulfilment, what is already present as a possibility in the child.

There is a great contrast between the daily life of the child in the cradle and the man in the office or the workshop. Is it possible to regard the one as merely the fulfilment of the other ? Does the one not contain elements that are entirely absent from the other ?

It is hardly possible to attempt an answer to these questions before we have considered the reasons why men work at all, and why they deliberately prefer some branches of work to others. Why some of them even prefer their work to holidays and their offices or workshops to their own homes.

It is quite common for men to speak of work as a necessary evil. But this is often said of marriage as well, and no one takes such criticism at all seriously.

But the word " necessary " has been used, and this is the essential thing about work. It is necessary. Those who do not work—with the exception of a favoured minority—may not eat. And when men do not work, and yet eat, we know that their share of the world's work is being done by somebody.

The necessity therefore that exists in connection with work is the necessity for gratifying the instinct of hunger.

This is, however, not all, for men might work to satisfy their hunger in many ways. A vocation is not chosen merely because it offers opportunities of breadwinning that are simpler, less laborious, or fuller than others.

The reasons that lead to a choice of vocation are better understood if we look back for a moment to a boy's first aspirations.

Boys express at an early age a wish to become perhaps a fireman, a policeman, an engine-driver or a tram-conductor. The choice does not depend very much upon the social position of the parents. It depends upon the conditions under which the boy has seen the men in question.

A boy does not wish to become a policeman because he has seen a policeman in shirt-sleeves and slippers, and discovered him to be a friendly, homely person. It is because he has seen him in an imposing uniform, stopping traffic by a wave of his hand, regulating pedestrian traffic, writing details of a street collision or accident in his note-book, or arresting a man and leading him to the station.

The attraction that the policeman's work has for the boy is that it seems to make the man of importance in the public eye, that it makes him stand out from the crowd. It is the secret, too, of the aspiration to become a car-conductor or an engine-driver.

There is, however, another type of man who attracts the boy's envy and inspires his ambitions. It is a kind of man who is fast disappearing: the type of which the village blacksmith and the village carpenter were such good examples. The forge

and the workshop used to attract the village boys, who lingered about the door, casting longing eyes at the men who were, by sheer strength and cleverness, making horseshoes and chairs, hoops and boxes.

Occasionally the business of the boy's father attracts him. It is generally because he has made a hero of his father, and hopes to be like him in all respects when he grows up.

As a rule, we may see all these phases entering at differing periods into a boy's life. He wants to be in all respects like the people he admires.

Does he admire them because he wants to be like them? Or does he want to be like them because he admires them?

This is a difficult question to answer. It is possible that the two are so bound up together, as two different expressions of the same fact, that we cannot consider one as the cause of the other.

In any case, the really important fact is that we can see in all these cases the simple expression of instincts. In the wish to be like a policeman we have the instinct of self-assertion expressed; in the wish to be like the blacksmith, or the carpenter, or the wheelwright, the instinct towards construction or creation. With this instinct of construction there goes, too, an element of the instinct of self-assertion; for it is to be remembered that these village craftsmen are important people, very much looked up to. The blacksmith, in particular, is well in the local limelight.

In any case, the frank expressions of a young child leave no doubt as to the reasons why he looks

forward to entering upon one of these occupations in days to come. He says, "When I am big, I shall be a policeman. I shall put up my hand, and all the motors will stop." Pure self-assertion, this.

Or he says, "When I am big, I will be a carpenter. Then I will make you a bigger table than the one in the drawing-room." Here is the instinct of creation or construction; mixed, however, with the instinct of self-assertion.

These simple cases help us at once to see the instinct as present when an older boy expresses a wish to be an engineer or an actor. The instinct to make things or to do things is present in each case; so also the instinct to be a man of some importance, the instinct of self-assertion. One boy is inclined to lay the emphasis on the former; the other on the latter.

How do we see the instinct of self-assertion expressed in the activities of men?

In very many ways.

There are many men still at work, though they might very well retire. They have sufficient to live upon very comfortably. They prefer, however, to remain in a place where they are at the head of affairs than to join the host of aimless mediocrities. It is better to be at the head of a small office than to spend one's days taking the dog for an airing.

There are men who might retire with a competency, but who are keenly set on accumulating a fortune.

Well, the world sets a great store by a fortune, whatever may be written to the contrary. One may not easily snub a million. We often speak of a

great man when we really mean a little man with a big fortune.

Property is regarded as an annexe of the man who possesses it. The child's ambition to be "big" remains with the man. The grown man who cannot add a cubit to his stature may add some thousands of pounds, or some hundreds of acres, or a few country houses, instead. They serve the same purpose as cubits. The man of immense stature, or the man of immense wealth, is equally on show.

Again, there are men who remain at work years after they need, because though they have accumulated enough for their own purposes and ambitions, they wish to gain more in order to satisfy the aspirations of their wives or daughters. This sympathy, which makes us look upon the aspirations of certain people as if they were our own, will need later consideration.

In every one of these cases we can see the instinct of self-assertion at work.

We recognise that it is this instinct that prompts enquiries on the part of a candidate for a post, as to the opportunities it offers for "getting on."

The recognition of this instinct accounts for the forms of publicity adopted by training institutions, correspondence colleges, and the like. They appeal to "ambition," which is very closely bound up with the instinct of self-assertion.

It is, on the other hand, the constructive instinct which makes a man demand some tangible result for his labour—something in the form of a large circulation for his paper, a really good proprietary article that he has invented and perfected, a widely

appreciated car produced by his firm. Or the gratification of the constructive instinct may come when a new bridge, a great dam, or a fine liner is completed, and the man looks upon a result which would never have been possible but for his labours.

Many men stay in business when they need not because they can gratify their desire to make and produce things in no other way.

If the gratification of instincts is a sufficiently strong inducement to impel men to remain at work when they need not, to prefer laborious days to pleasure, then it follows that here is the direction of the main streams of their interest.

It follows, too, that somewhere—at one point or many—of this development from instinct to activity is the point at which an appeal can be made, of a nature that is likely to succeed in diverting interest to the subject of the appeal.

The most successful publicity, therefore, so far as these men are concerned, must be applied at some point of this stream.

Chapter V

DEVELOPMENT

IT is not easy, when one stands at a certain stage of development, to realise any of the earlier stages. The professor who understands the point of view and appreciates the difficulties of an undergraduate is rare. The grown man who can understand the point of view of a child is rarer still.

A grown man is often able to explain things to a child in a simple and clear manner. But making the child understand you is not quite the same thing as you understanding the child.

If the child asks you why stones have different colours, you may or may not be able to tell him. You may or may not know. But you are quite capable of looking up the matter in a book of reference, and then stating your knowledge in terms so simple that the child understands your meaning with ease. But do you understand why he takes such an interest in coloured pebbles and why he collects them so ardently ?

You did so yourself once, but you cannot remember why. You cannot remember what you thought of them. You are driven back on some vague statement, such as, " I used to think a great deal of them myself when I was his age. I know I collected a great many. I suppose that it is natural."

We have all to admit ignorance at some point or other. The use of the word "natural" is really a confession of ignorance, though most people think that it is an expression of profound wisdom.

Some people, however, neither admit their ignorance at this point, nor deceive themselves by the use of a word that after all means nothing whatsoever. They attempt an explanation. A great deal of explanation of the conduct of children rests on an assumption that is an unsound one. The grown man knows that, if he were to collect pebbles, he would have some reason for doing so. He takes for granted that the child is prompted by the same reasons.

A great deal of very unsound matter has been written about children by people who have credited the child with an adult mind and an adult outlook. No proper allowance is made for development.

There is no doubt that the child looks upon coloured pebbles as property. Adults do the same. But adults are a great deal more discriminating than the child. They demand, not that their pebbles shall be striking and attractive merely, but that they shall be valuable.

There are certain ways in which the possession of pebbles adds to the self-importance of the child. For one thing, he has found them himself, and he values them partly by the trouble they have cost in the search. But the element of rarity comes in also. One sees a small boy showing a stone to another and hears him saying, with an air of challenge, "You haven't got one like it!"

This is important. Men and women value jewels

when they are unique. Yellow diamonds are common. Blue diamonds are rare. Consequently blue diamonds are prized. It is not merely that in such a stone we possess a rarity, but also that other people wish for it and envy us its possession.

We are inclined to believe that people collect precious stones because they are valuable, and that consequently their purchase is a good investment. But the value is a fictitious one, since it merely depends upon the desire of people to possess the stone. It does not depend at all upon beauty or usefulness. In the desert the value of diamonds would decrease, whilst that of bread and water would increase.

Whatever be the origin of the appreciation of the child for pebbles—and this origin is not of immediate importance to us—we see the interest continuing into the life of the grown man. But the interest is transferred. It has passed from pebbles that are of value because they are sought for by oneself to pebbles that are valued because other men desire them or for the money value they possess on this account. Diamonds and pearls that are unique and of great value add to the importance of their possessors.

Apparently we meet here again with the important "instinct of self-assertion." But as we now meet it, whether in the boy or in the man, it has developed a great deal from the form it took in the case of the child in the cradle. There the only actions were screaming, kicking and waving the arms. The only object was to attract the attention of the people who could give the infant food.

Now, however, the intention is to appear great in the eyes of other people. Not to appear great only, but to be great. There is a reference to other people, but there is also an idea of the self.

The reference to other people is different from that of the infant. There is a knowledge of the standards of other people, and an understanding of the attitude of other people towards oneself.

It is very doubtful if the baby has any idea of the self at all.

Everybody has seen the baby holding up its hands against the light; moving its fingers and watching them. The mouth and eyes come in for a great deal of exploration. Then there are also early attempts to eat the hands; to get them inside the mouth and to swallow them. The feet are looked at and handled.

These facts go to suggest that the child is regarding himself very much as a man regards the world outside himself. They suggest that the baby looks upon himself as being outside himself. If he could possibly express himself intelligently, we should discover that "me" has an entirely different meaning for him from that which it possesses for us.

We are confirmed in this belief by what we know of the idea of the self as we find it amongst simple savages, who, however simple they may be, have progressed a great deal farther than has the baby.

The child seems to develop in the direction of acquiring a knowledge of himself in the years that lie between three and ten.

He begins with companions that are imaginary,

or make-believe. It is worth while to consider these in some detail later, for reasons that will be clear. At the moment it is sufficient to say that the main purpose of these imaginary companions is to provide for himself people who attend to him, who admire him, who obey him. When the child is rebuffed by an adult, he finds a solace in the presence of the make-believe companion.

This is not very different from the grown-up, who very often after a snub seeks out a friend who is sympathetic and who appreciates him.

Toys, too, play a very important part in the life of the child. It is important to distinguish his play at this stage from that team-play which will interest him when he is older. Over his play-things and his play-country the child reigns like a king. Here his word is law. His wishes are carried out. His soldiers and his dolls go where he will have them.

He attempts to carry into the real world what he has learned with his make-believe companions and his toys. Here he often comes to grief.

The children he meets are not so obliging and complacent as are those of his imagination. He cannot treat boys and girls of his own age as toy soldiers.

Each of his real playmates has as much desire as himself to rule the roost. A country in which every man is a king is a democracy, and the world of children at play becomes one in time. Not, however, in the first instance.

When the child has to consider his own wishes and also the actual facts of life, he is at the point

of learning the lesson of compromise. He may compromise little or much; easily or with great reluctance.

If he will compromise only a little, two courses are open to him. He may assert himself so much that he rules his companions as a tyrant, forcing them to bow to him. If he is strong and vigorous, this is easier for him than for a weak child.

He may, on the other hand, refuse to assert himself. He may stand aside and watch, or withdraw from real companions altogether, returning to the world of toys and books.

Again, he may compromise so much that we are able to think of him as surrendering. He joins in all the play of his companions, accepting their decisions and their ruling. But it is important to notice that here, by this sacrifice, he gains his end, since others love him and value him. He becomes indispensable to those who wish to rule.

Generally, however, a compromise is effected, more or less easily. Children take turns in ordering the play. And, as each is very much concerned in seeing that his own share is a full one, some sort of justice and fairness comes into being.

In the end, therefore, the play comes to gratify an instinct of self-assertion. The road has become a roundabout one already. There is no longer the short direct cut from impulse to end. Testing of oneself and knowledge of oneself, testing and knowledge of the real world of companions, reasoning, judgment, all have come into operation before such complicated action is possible.

Experience has brought knowledge. Reasoning

about experience has made possible the making of plans in advance. After the plan comes experiment. If the plan is a good one, leading to satisfactory results, then one may pass on to greater plans. If it fails in any respect, then experience enables it to be modified.

As the instinct becomes developed and complicated in this way, there comes a point where it meets with other instincts.

An event in a child's life to which it looks forward and which gives it great standing amongst its friends, is the giving of a tea-party. Here the hunger instinct is linked on with the instinct of self-assertion.

Nobody will miss the latter element in the little host's make-up. Unless he is an exceptional child, he will wish to arrange all the games and generally take command; meeting all the objections with the statement, "It's MY PARTY."

Very often the giver of the party has to be sent to bed in order that the party may go on.

The order of development that the child follows would seem to be:

From birth till the age of three, the instinct that is receiving attention is the "hunger instinct." By the time he is three years of age, he has learned to eat solid food, to eat without undue greediness, and to demand food only when he is hungry. He has a knowledge then of how to maintain his own life when he is able to get food. He no longer makes futile attempts to eat things that are not edible, though he may make some errors.

From three to ten he learns a great deal about

himself and his own powers. He learns generally to take care of himself and to defend himself.

The great mass of ideas about food that the child collects is often spoken of as the "food complex." The mass of ideas about the self is spoken of as the "ego complex." By a "complex" we shall mean a mass of ideas, all linked together, and all centring about an instinctive impulse.

All mental development is the formation of complexes.

Chapter VI

THE PLACE OF REASON

THE principal point about the activities of men is that they serve to gratify instincts, but by routes that are devious. They contrast very sharply with the attempts of the child to secure immediate gratification.

Occasionally writers suggest to us that our lives are artificial, and that we should become "natural." As a rule, little more is meant by this than that we should recognise instincts and that we should attempt to gratify them so soon as we become aware of desire. So soon as we strip a statement of this kind of the beautiful language in which it is often concealed, its true meaning becomes: Men are animals. Let us therefore live as animals.

The lowest savages we know live according to a higher rule than this.

It is true that the life of cities has become so complex, the end of all our endeavour so far out of sight, that we are often tempted to believe that there is no end, no purpose, no goal.

This world-weariness is very much like the so-called "industrial fatigue." The man who labours at a tiny fragment of a process that goes to make a complete result that he never sees, feels about his job as other men often feel about life. It becomes

difficult to believe that all endeavour produces a result at some place at some time to some one.

In every attempt of men to live together in communities we see expressed in conduct the belief that some curb must be placed upon the direct and immediate gratification of instincts.

With the savage the law of the totem forbids him to eat, however hungry he may be, certain flesh. If he is a member of the Kangaroo totem, then in no circumstances may he eat the flesh of the kangaroo. Again, women of the Kangaroo totem are rigorously barred from him.

No explanation of the law of the totem exists. Attempts have been made to give reasons for it, but none of these explains all the facts. Even if we do not know the "why" of the matter, we know the results—that gratification of the two great biological instincts is forbidden in part.

In civilised communities, too, strong restrictions obtain. However hungry a man may be, he must respect property. He may not steal. He may not take food belonging to another without the permission of the owner, or without payment. If he break these laws, then the whole community takes the side of the aggrieved man. The man who breaks the law sets the community against him and becomes an outlaw, until his punishment has been completed.

The infant, on the other hand, respects no laws: since he knows none. All he knows is his own desire, his impulse, and he obeys it promptly; almost as if he were a mere machine.

Such conduct is liable to error. It has been

shown that the blind obedience to impulse that we believe is the law of insect life is fatal to the individual in many instances. The obedience to impulse works perfectly, so long as circumstances suit. But a change in circumstances does not bring about a change in behaviour. The machinery works in the same way, even though it may work for death and not for life.

Man, more than any other animal, is adaptable. Man survives in climates other than those in which he was born. He survives and dominates in lands that are sterile. He crosses barriers that have successfully prevented the migrations of all other animals. A thousand miles of sea, a thousand miles of desert, are the same to him.

Fundamentally, there is no difference between the man who triumphs on the highest peak of Everest and the boy who exults on the summit of a sand-castle. The same instinct has been gratified.

Neither has taken the shortest cut to self-assertion. Each has planned. Each has found difficulties to surmount. Each has surmounted them.

In each case we have a process of thinking out in advance a road to an achievement. We have planning.

All thought is not necessarily planning.

Planning has to take into consideration two main factors. There is the end to be achieved. There is the organism that is to achieve it. The man who plans must have knowledge of himself and his resources, and a knowledge of the goal at which he aims.

These have to be related to one another. It is

in this relating together two things that we discover the beginnings of reason.

There is more than this, however. Any process of planning discovers alternatives. Here comes in the need for comparison, and for decision and choice.

Thought eliminates failures. Thought enables men to see failures before they are made and to avoid them. The animal goes on to the carrying out of an activity, and knows it as a failure, apparently, when the failure has been made. The creature may be merely baffled. It may be killed, since in the jungle and the sea failures are costly. Men are able to avoid failures before they make them.

Here, then, is the process of reason at work. It is interposed between impulse and object. It leads man to success. Not to the immediate petty, momentary success that comes of an impulse gratified, but the success that comes of continued endeavour crowned by achievement.

It follows that we cannot belittle reason. If instincts have made us animals, it is reason that has made us men. If we owe our life to instinct, we owe our way of life to reason. To most of us, our way of life seems more than mere life itself.

The animal is hungry, and searches for food. It goes hungry till it finds food, but so soon as the immediate appetite is satisfied, it rests. The hungry dog has sufficient foresight to remain by its kill till it has devoured it. The boa eats the whole of its kill; satisfying its hunger for days to come, and lying torpid at the mercy of any one of its

enemies. The squirrel and the dormouse hoard against the lean days of winter. Certain ants appear to cultivate fungi on which they may live.

Contrast this with the behaviour of man! The same instincts prompt, the same end is in sight, but reason has interposed between the two. Man has developed agriculture, transport and commerce. All over the world men are labouring in fields, anticipating the hunger of mankind by months and years. My hunger to-day was foreseen one, two or three years ago. As a result, I am able to go on placidly with my work, in place of leaving it and foraging like a wild dog.

In place of grabbing the nearest thing and putting it to my mouth to test whether it might be eaten or not, the reason of man has enabled me to feed on the wheat of Argentine, the mutton of Australia, the fruit of California, the fish of the Canadian rivers. It is as if reason had extended my arms, so that my hands reach to all these places, and take the means to satisfy my hunger.

Reason works to make man great. It extends his organs. With the microscope it gives him keener sight. With the telescope it gives him an extended range of material vision. With the camera and the written record it makes his memory permanent and clear. With the automobile and the train and the steamboat it gives him swift and tireless feet. With the telephone it makes his voice carry beyond his immediate circle, so that he may greet other men in Melbourne or San Francisco, and be clearly heard.

Reason develops, therefore, as a means to achieve-

ment. It extends man, and so brings the earth within his compass. We have already used the illustration of the child lying in its cradle, stretching out its hands towards the things that are near. Imagine, in spite of its grotesqueness, the arms of the child lengthened, so that as it desires things in turn, it is able to reach them. Imagine in the end, its hands hovering over the whole world, and the arms still growing with the promise that ultimately the hand shall grope among the stars.

This is fact. Man's arms have been so lengthened. The world moves and acts in response to desire. But the way in which it acts and moves, the orderly way of life that in greater or less degree characterises human life, is the result of reason.

Planning inevitably outruns performance. And as a result, every human achievement is born in the brain of man, as an idea, before it becomes a fact, an achievement. Einstein promises us already a knowledge of the bounds of the universe. So far as any of us can see at the moment, no achievement of fact will follow the discovery. But he would be a bold man, and a foolish one, who would dare to say that no result can possibly follow.

In the mind of a Marconi, man has already communicated with man through the ether before a single actual word has passed. The impulse has been felt, the end foreseen. All that remains is to construct the road.

Every man who has tramped at all knows how possible it is to fall in love with the road. One sets out. One decides where to go. And suddenly, so beautiful is the road, that the whither it

leads becomes of no importance whatever. The same is sometimes true of reason.

Men find reasoning and planning so attractive in themselves that they become careless of achievement. They lose sight of the goal in view. They diverge into by-roads. They reach something quite different from that of which they were in search.

Of such stuff, broadly speaking, are the philosophers and the scientists made. Such men are careless of the achievements of fact, though in reality no other men have done so much to make these possible. They resemble the man who set out to find his father's asses and who found a kingdom. They discover new roads, new goals. Other men step in and transform these into highways, by which all men may reach new goals.

It was in the course of researches into the nature of ultra-violet light, a purely academic research, that Röntgen stumbled upon the X-rays, and so made a host of commercial achievements possible. He had no thought of possibilities in connection with surgical and metallurgical work.

Behind the achievements of Marconi there stands the labour of Clerk-Maxwell and Hertz.

It becomes possible, therefore, to distinguish at this stage two classes of men. Both agree in being driven forward by instinctive impulses. But in the one case it is the road that is important; in the other the goal alone counts. It is difficult for these to travel together. The one wants to hasten, the other to linger. The one wishes to explore the by-ways, the other to keep to the main road. In

everyday life we distinguish these as the dreamer and the practical man, the philosopher and the business man. Each grumbles at the other; each fails to understand and is impatient of the other. But in truth each is indispensable to the other, to life and to man. Each makes possible the development of the other. The best men of each kind have never failed to see this. Business men have endowed the universities. Scientists have put their knowledge, gratuitously as a rule, at the disposal of the business man.

Dreaming will not grow potatoes, it has been said. But potatoes came to Europe in the first instance from a land discovered by a dreamer.

Chapter VII

SUGGESTION

IT is a great deal easier for most men to do a thing that a number of other people are already doing, than it is for them to do it alone.

It is easier for most of us to be disciples than to be pioneers.

Very few men would dare venture into the streets wearing, say, a brilliant scarlet tie with vivid green spots the size of a shilling. Yet if such ties became the fashion, by some chance or other, we should wear them without a thought.

There is no exaggeration of dress or manner so extreme that people will hesitate to adopt it, provided that it be the current mode.

Reason plays very little part in the matter, and taste apparently less.

When recently fashion abbreviated ladies' skirts very considerably, some of the first people to rush to extremes in the matter were those who should have hesitated longest: who should never have proceeded beyond hesitation.

If a pretty revue actress should wear a startling hat, which augments and draws attention to certain pleasing features of her face, we may be sure that similar hats will soon be on the heads of people who

lack the pleasing features, and whose lack of them becomes more apparent than ever in presence of the hat.

The situation has long been a favourite with humorous artists. Everyone is familiar with the picture of the elephantine lady, multichinned and far advanced beyond middle age, who, after watching a young and slender mannequin parading in a frock, orders one exactly like it.

Matters do not stop at manners and dress.

How many people are able to pass a crowd, for instance, without feeling a compulsion to step aside and join it ?

If you think at all about it, you will realise that you have done a number of things in the day that have not been prompted by reason at all. That is, you have never thought them out and adopted them because you considered that they were good. Some of them, you may say, you do because they are habits.

This explanation does not help at all. A habit is only a way of acting that has become practically automatic because it has been done so often. Why was it done in the first instance ?

Some of your habits began as reasoned acts, undoubtedly. Some of your daily activities have been reasoned out, and are carried out because they seemed to you the best thing to do.

You wear a particular sort of collar. You may or may not carry a stick. You may or may not wear spats. You travel to town each day by a carriage of a certain class, and you would laugh or show surprise if anyone were to suggest that you should

travel by any other class. Daily you eat a lunch of a particular type—so many courses—in a restaurant of a particular type.

For all these things doubtless you could give what might be called reasons. But would they be reasons? Reasons should go before conduct. Reasons should decide conduct.

With the majority of these actions of yours the action has come first. When you are challenged to say why you do them, you make a statement. But it was not this that determined the action. You are not giving a reason, but AN EXCUSE.

Why do you smoke? Because you do your work better, and because it is so good for your nerves.

Dare you swear that you thought over the state of your work and made enquiries as to what you might do to make yourself more efficient? That you made enquiries as to what means you might take to steady your unsteady nerves? That you found "tobacco" was the answer to both questions?

It is hardly likely that your early experiments gave you much confidence in your adviser.

If your reason for taking up smoking was either of these, or both, the case is different with most men. As a rule men smoke because other men smoke. The sight of other men smoking and enjoying it is a continual suggestion: "Go thou and do likewise."

The same things are true of your collar and your tie, of many of your tastes, of the books you read and the soap you buy, of the kind of house in which you live and the furniture and pictures with which you surround yourself. You buy and wear and use

these things because other people buy and wear and use them.

Psychologists use the word "suggestion." The word explains very little, and most writers on the subject have been hard put to it to discover a satisfactory definition.

Fortunately a definition is not necessary. All that is essential is that the fact shall be faced—that a great many things that we do are done without planning on our own part. Other people do them, or other people speak of them to us—and we find ourselves doing them or wanting to do them.

It is not, as a rule, good policy to embody a suggestion in a forcible, direct statement. It succeeds with some kind of people, but not with all.

A forcible, direct statement comes to most men —to British men in particular—as a challenge, which they are not slow to take up.

The book agent who enters an office with the remark, "You can't get on without this book," will be likely to have the retort flung at him, "I've got on without it for twenty years, and I'm going to get on without it."

A more skilful use of suggestion would take some such form as the following: "I think that you would find this book indispensable if you had it by you for a few days. I'll leave it with you just now, and look in again at the end of the week."

The suggestion here is a double one. First, that the book will be found indispensable. Second, that the agent believes what he says.

Crowds, as a rule, suggest to us action that is imitative. Individuals, too, may suggest that we

imitate their actions. In both cases, the suggestion is conveyed, not by words, but by actions that are already being performed.

Advertisements suggest action through words or pictures. The pictures represent people who might be ourselves, or people whom we might readily be willing to imitate.

This is, of course, not an explanation of the appeal of ALL pictorial advertisement; but is merely an illustration of the way in which suggestion is employed in picture form.

There is a suggestion in the wording so often seen on the placards of music-hall performances—"All seats may be booked in advance." The suggestion is that you will not get a seat unless you book. In other words, that many people go to that particular hall.

There is a suggestion contained in a "well-dressed front of the house" of a theatre; a suggestion that is of sufficient value to a manager to make him give away seats in the stalls if he cannot sell them. For empty stalls are themselves a suggestion, and one that does not make for the theatre's good.

The phrases of the skilful salesman are, in the main, suggestions. After a few trials, sometimes before, he has realised to what kind of suggestion the customer is most likely to respond. "We are selling a great deal of this just now"—"You would find a stronger colour more effective"—"You have the right height for a coat of this kind"—and so on.

Any consideration of suggestion makes it clear

why so many people call in at a shop for a small purchase and leave with a very large parcel.

But a little consideration makes it clear, also, that we do not always imitate the actions that we see.

Business men will delay for a while and cross the road because they see a few people assembled. But if they see a number of navvies employed in breaking up the road surface they do not make any attempts to seize picks and to join in the labour.

The fact is an obvious one. Children might, on seeing the navvies at work, pretend to work like them; imitating them in play, with such implements as they were able to secure.

It has to be explained, however, why some actions are adopted as a result of suggestion, whilst some others are not.

Perhaps the statement might be differently worded. We ought not to regard the actions which we do not attempt to imitate as SUGGESTIONS. They suggest no action to us.

The common-sense answer would be that we did not attempt to imitate some actions because we do not want to. This, however, implies that we do want to buy and wear all the things that we buy and wear as a result of suggestion; and that we do want to join crowds.

Common sense has more than once justified itself against the academic view.

Shall we say, then, that the man in the shop has succeeded in creating a want?

Want, or desire, is, as we have already discovered,

interest. We decided, however, that it is impossible to create interest.

We are forced to believe, therefore, that the interest was already there. In us, though we knew nothing of its existence. It has remained for the salesman to make us aware of our wants.

Here is the reason of "crime waves." The publication of the details of a horrible crime is at once followed by the commission of similar crimes. The published story has acted as a suggestion, BUT ONLY TO THOSE PEOPLE WHO ALREADY HAVE AN INTEREST—OF WHICH THEY ARE NOT AWARE—IN CRIME.

It is an important conclusion, this, that it is possible to possess interest, striving in certain directions, and yet to be unaware of it. We are forced to the belief that there may exist regions of the mind, working in certain ways, without any knowledge of the fact on our own part.

Further, there is the important practical conclusion, that interest which is not conscious may be tapped by means of suggestion.

Last of all, the discussion of suggestion has led us back to interest, and so to instinct. Every psychological problem that we discuss will lead us back—as inevitably as the priest and the cow and the maiden lead us back to the house that Jack built—to the instincts.

Chapter VIII

AUTO-SUGGESTION

AUTO-SUGGESTION is a word whose cumbrous qualities have not prevented it from becoming very popular.

It is not altogether a new word. It has been in the books for some years. Lately it has appeared in the newspapers as well, mainly in association with the name of M. Coué.

M. Coué is a great man who, like so many other great men, is in urgent need of protection from his friends.

The clue to the meaning of auto-suggestion is contained in the latter part of the previous chapter. We discovered there that not all the things we see and hear act as suggestions to us. That what is a suggestion for one person is not a suggestion for another.

On a hot afternoon the sight of an ice-cream barrow may prompt me to call in at the nearest café and order an ice. On a winter afternoon the sight of the same barrow—strangely enough, such things are often seen in the London streets in the depths of winter—may merely make me smile. It will certainly not send me in search of ices.

It may be said that the actions I see carried on

about me may leave me indifferent, may prompt me to imitative action, or may provoke in me strong opposition. It is only those which act in one of the last two ways that can be regarded as suggestions.

Imitation or opposition are proofs of the presence of interest. Indifference means the absence of interest.

So that, when we are considering suggestion at all, we have to consider two factors: the person whose interest is aroused and the action which arouses his interest.

Since all suggestions work through the interest of the individual, since it is his own interest that prompts him to act in accordance with the suggested action—ALL SUGGESTION IS AUTO-SUGGESTION.

It was emphasised in the seventh chapter of this book that a direct clear statement is always likely to arouse opposition. A good salesman seldom makes a statement that sounds at all like a command. He seldom says, "You must have a tie like this."

The mildest of men resent being commanded by others. The instinct of self-assertion prompts them to disobey; to assert themselves by opposition.

This seems true even of commands that we address to ourselves. There are many things we decide to do and forget to do. There are things that we feel that we ought to do and must do, and that we yet neglect.

Men tie knots in their handkerchiefs, and later find that they have forgotten what the knot was for. In their own homes, when it is impossible to do what they intended, they suddenly remember.

The reasons for this will have to be considered later. They are important, but they are not relevant to the present chapter.

Many people have read books on " new thought " in order to combat such tendencies in themselves. Some of these books contain much that is of value, but the contents of many are not exactly " new," and are often free of anything that can be called " thought."

In some of these books there is a great deal about auto-suggestion. The general idea—not an invariable one—is that if you have a bad habit of any sort of which you wish to be rid, you ought to talk to yourself about it in an impressive way before you go to bed.

If you have an unpleasant duty before you, that you think you are likely to forget or to try to evade, you are recommended to adopt the same course of action.

You stand at your bedside. You clench your hands, you thrust out your jaw, you expand your chest, and you say, with something of the air of Ajax defying the lightnings, " To-morrow morning I will discharge the cook." Gradually you begin to find yourself feeling heroic, as if discharging the cook were something like fighting Dempsey, and as if you were capable of tackling the task with ease. In such a mood you get into bed and fall asleep.

Morning comes. You are reminded by your wife that the cook has to be discharged. You remember the exercises of the night before. Discharging the cook still seems similar to challenging Dempsey. But on the other hand, you yourself seem smaller

than you did last night. You cannot recover the heroic feeling, though the task refuses to shrink in the same proportion.

You discover that, unless you hurry, you will be late for the office. You hurry off, muttering something about servants being "a woman's job."

That is the precise effect that "suggestion" of this sort has upon many people. It permanently magnifies the task that has to be faced, but it does not permanently magnify the individual who has to face it.

In Tolstoi's essay, "Why do men drug themselves?" he speaks of a man who was about to commit a murder that he and a woman had planned between them. He found it difficult to face the task. He did not grit his teeth and clench his fists and push out his chin. No; he sat down and smoked a cigarette.

Then he went to commit the murder without any difficulty.

That seems understandable. It is on a par with all experience. If a man steels himself with resolution to meet a difficult situation, he generally breaks down when he faces the situation. There are, of course, exceptional men. This, however, is the rule.

Resolution is an effort of will. The will may resolve on something that is in direct opposition to what we have spoken of as interest. Coué would speak of "imagination"—which, as he uses the word, means much the same thing.

Coué claims, and there is very little doubt that he is right, that when resolution—or will—comes

into conflict with interest—or imagination—interest always wins.

Why do you forget the things that you have resolved to do? Has your mind been a complete blank? You say, "I had so many things to think of, that they drove it completely out of my head."

Run over the many things that you had to think of. Some of them were important, since they were connected with your plans, your work, your advancement. But many of them were mere trifles. Trifles though they were, they possessed more interest for you than did the matter of your resolutions.

When the trifles that were interesting came into conflict with the resolutions that were not interesting to you, the battle had but one issue. The resolutions were, as you rightly say, driven out of your head. They yielded to superior force. The trifles were backed by the force of your interest, the driving power of your mind.

Out of Coué's theory Coué's methods grow naturally.

These methods are the reverse of those which have been spoken of earlier in this chapter. Their general result may be regarded as opposite in its character. Speaking generally, they diminish the task, whilst they augment the subject—the person who is making suggestions to himself.

They attempt to link on the suggested matter to the interest.

You do not stand and adopt heroic and tense attitudes. You lie down quietly in bed, or sit comfortably in the most cosy chair you have.

The relaxation is the secret of Tolstoi's mur-

derer. Smoking a cigarette, idly watching the smoke, lounging comfortably—at such times a man is more relaxed than at any others. Relaxation is difficult to men and women of to-day, and very few can do it without a great deal of practice.

Then you regard the task as already accomplished. You do not trouble about how, or in what way. You do not wonder how you shall go about it. You do not think over the difficulties that are to be overcome. You think only of the result; but even this with no fierce concentration.

You say to yourself that a certain result will come about. Coué has found that his all-embracing formula, "Day by day, in every way, I shall become better," has been very successful. But there is no reason why specific wishes should not be expressed.

Repetition is of great value in enforcing something upon the mind, as every advertiser is aware. He does not post a large number of placards of the same kind so that nobody shall miss seeing them, but largely so that the same people shall see them again and again.

Coué finds that his formula is most effective when it is repeated every night and twenty times each night.

The number twenty has no magical value. It happens to be a good working number.

He has suggested that a piece of string with twenty knots in it should be used. Again there is no virtue in a piece of string with knots in it. But any attempt at counting would distract the mind from its relaxation.

Public attention has been attracted to Coué on account of the application of his theories to the cure of illness. Illness has a great fascination for most people. We are all interested in situations that call for the devotion of our friends; that call for the attention and care of other people. Many people would attract no attention of any kind from others, unless they could be ill and so attract pity to themselves.

The cure of illnesses is no business of ours in this book. It is entirely a matter for medical men. Coué's methods will be employed, are being employed, by physicians, where these methods seem advisable.

There are dangers in their employment by others. Medical men sometimes ask psychologists to help them, where it seems that the psychologist can apply his particular methods with advantage. But the medical man is always at hand, to watch results and to see if progress is being made in the desired direction.

Methods of auto-suggestion are being advertised widely by quacks in Britain and America. These men claim to cure diseases that they cannot even diagnose, by methods which they do not understand—as anyone with the requisite knowledge may learn from their advertisements.

Quacks seldom advertise in quarters where their notices are likely to meet the eye of people possessing the requisite knowledge.

The sign by which you may know a quack is that he guarantees a certain result—a definite cure.

A *bona fide* lawyer does not guarantee that he

will win your case. A *bona fide* medical man never guarantees a cure.

All that you have a right to demand of a professional man is that he shall devote the whole of his professional skill to your particular service. Only a quack will promise you more than this.

About any great man or any great discovery quacks flourish, like parasites upon the forest trees.

And M. Coué is a great man.

Chapter IX

DAYDREAMING

IN the chapters which dealt with "suggestion" and "auto-suggestion" it was necessary to speak of an interest of which we were not aware; to which the "suggestion" appealed.

It might be misleading to speak of a "wish" here. But all of us are quite aware that there are occasions on which we have said, "This is exactly what I wanted. I never knew before that I did want it."

We have already said that in the presence of food, or in those moments when we actually think of food, we experience a desire for "food." But we are all aware that there are moments when we are working, in which we experience an uneasiness, and yet it does not dawn on us that we are hungry. We do not here speak of a desire or a wish.

Perhaps the word "craving" will fit the case. "Craving" is, however, a rather strong word, and the feeling of uneasiness of which we are speaking is often quite mild. Sufficiently strong, perhaps, to make us realise that we are not working at our highest efficiency; but no more.

Hunger has been used here for the sake of an example, but hunger does not often trouble the

average man. Owing to an abundance of food in our cities, its comparatively low cost, and to regular habits of eating, only an unfortunate minority of the population ever experiences acute hunger. Other instincts trouble us a great deal more than does hunger.

The reason for this is that the satisfaction of hunger is essential to life. Unless you take measures to gratify the hunger of a community, there will not be any community at all. As a result, all civilisations are organised very largely as food-producing and food-collecting and food-distributing organisations.

For other purposes civilised communities are less efficiently organised.

The interests of which we are unaware are those which have never become transformed into desires. Once interest has become desire, we are aware of it, and we are at once able to begin planning in order to transform the desire into accomplishment.

Everyone is familiar with what is commonly called mind-wandering. It is something to which all men are given, more or less.

It is commonest, perhaps, in the case of people who are engaged at routine work. They become abstracted. They become aware, a few moments later, that they have not been thinking of their work at all, but of something else, quite unconnected with it.

Often they find it difficult to say of what it is that they have been thinking in the interval.

Some people, however, are well able to recall what it is that they have been thinking of. It is

often a sharp clear picture, so vivid as to seem real, that has appeared before them. Sometimes there is a scene, very unlike their real surroundings. Often it includes a number of people.

We speak here of a "daydream." The word "dream" is used, partly because the whole is so unreal; partly because, apart from the fact that the man is not asleep, the whole bears a great resemblance to night dreaming.

The first point of importance is the fact that although the man's life, in a measure, is bound up with his work, the daydream is able to lure him away from it. His career, his salary, his future—all these depend upon the work, and yet he abandons it, for a time at least, and gives so much attention to the daydream that he forgets completely his surroundings and his task.

Is any further proof necessary of the fact that THE DAYDREAM IS AT TIMES MORE INTERESTING THAN ACTUAL MATTERS OF PRIME IMPORTANCE?

What are daydreams about?

They vary.

Men have told me that their daydreams are about their work. Such men have claimed that their daydreams did not take them away from their work at all.

A few questions have put a different complexion on the matter, however. The daydream may be connected with work. But it is a very different kind of thing from the planning that is so necessary in the case of all good work.

Planning, it will be remembered, had to take into account two factors—the work that had to be done,

and the ability and resources of the man who was to do it.

Daydreaming about work takes into account one only of these. The daydreaming is always about the daydreamer and his own feelings.

When you daydream about your work, therefore, it is not the work, but yourself doing the work, that interests you. You see yourself doing amazing things, astonishing other people and yourself. And in presence of this amazing vision of yourself, you begin to "feel good." You cease to be an ordinary man. You become a prodigy. You tower over your business and your fellows like a colossus.

When the daydream ends, you come back to earth. You fall, rather than soar gently. Most daydreams end with a sigh.

Most people find daydreaming pleasant.

This fact gives us a clue to an understanding of the daydream. When we feel pleasure, interest has reached a goal for the time being. An instinct has been gratified.

The daydream of the type referred to is clearly connected with the instinct of self-assertion.

Interest has reached a goal. This is true, but the goal is not a real one. It is a phantom of the mind. It is a collection of ideas.

Your work and your play, on the other hand, are real goals of interest.

It follows, therefore, that some of your interest is directed to the outside world, and is driving you on to real activities. Another part is directed to ideas within yourself, driving you on to a futile activity, which interferes with your real activities.

This makes of your mind a kingdom divided against itself. The way in which it can be unified is by directing all one's stock of interest towards real ends.

The fact that some of your interest is expended in daydreaming suggests that your business, your home, your recreations are not utilising the whole of your interest.

This is because, probably, your interest has not made itself clear to you in the form of desire. Because, in fact, you do not know what it is that you want.

There are as many daydreams as there are men and women. It would be very easy to give examples; but since every man's daydream contains a few elements that make it his own daydream, distinct from that of any other person whomsoever, it would be misleading to quote a few, and to deal with those.

Return to the daydream that has been spoken of. It shows clearly, if we may regard it as a "wish," that the man whose daydream it is wishes very much to be regarded as a prodigy. Very likely he is nothing of the sort. If, however, he were to consider what his daydream has shown him so clearly, he might take some steps in this direction.

He might consider seriously what capacity he has for becoming a prodigy. He might consider what opportunities his life offers him for excelling in some particular way. This is real planning. It may not result in the man becoming a prodigy.

It will certainly take him farther on the way than will daydreaming.

But daydreaming is so fatally easy, and gives so much pleasure for no effort, that thousands of people indulge in it to their own cost. It is a habit that is extraordinarily like the taking of drugs. The daydream is a " psychic opium."

The daydream makes very clear the meaning of the first chapter of this book—" Two Kinds of Advertising." In the one case we make our appeal to plans ; in the other, to daydreams.

In the one case the advertiser says to the specialist, " We can help you to realise your plans."

In the other, he says to the ordinary man, " We can make your daydreams come true."

At the moment there is on the hoardings a singularly beautiful poster. It represents a girl standing near the edge of a frothing sea. Cliffs and seabirds are in the picture and the sky is heavily clouded. The first word of the legend underneath is " Save."

Here is all the material of what is probably the commonest of daydreams ; one that can be met with over and over again in youths.

Boys and men dream again and again of saving from danger a beautiful girl. That is the preface. It is the sequel that is most important. They are thanked, applauded, and admired without stint.

It is the daydream of gaining the admiration and worship of others.

In real life such things have to be worked for, arduously and continuously. In the daydream they come easily.

It is not a far step from daydreaming to read books or to watch films and plays that deal with these

themes. Crude melodrama, whether on the stage or the screen or in the printed book, is very far removed from real life.

It is, however, very close to the daydreams of the people who appreciate it.

This is the reason of its success.

This is true not only of crude productions. It applies equally to those of a higher class. Superior craft has gone to the making of these. They are better written, better acted, better produced. They have been worked over till they no longer look so unreal as the poorer class of work. They seem less extravagant. But the core and heart of them is the daydream.

If there is a single clue to the secret of popularity, it would seem to be CONFORMITY TO THE DAYDREAM. All appeals to a great general public that are widely responded to appeal, not to the interest that is directed outwards, to real ends in a real world, but to the interest that is bound up within, that strives to escape, and that in its strivings creates the daydream.

The widely popular appeal makes use of daydreams of a type that are common to great masses of men.

This is true, not merely of books and plays. It is also true of all forms of publicity.

Chapter X

THE OUTCROPPING OF INTEREST

IT is probably now clear that the mental life that is progressive is one in which interest is continually being directed to goals in the real world. So fast as human interest leaves its central reservoir it is used.

That is an ideal life. Few of us lead such.

The very fact that we daydream proves that all our interest is not directed to real ends.

We are able to see three ways in which interest manifests itself.

There is, first of all, the daydream. Later, we shall have to consider some other things that are closely related. These are all mental creations, fantasies, created because interest is not permitted to satisfy itself with real things.

There is, secondly, the work of art. Again, we shall later have to consider other things that are related. Here man creates fictions, since he cannot find real directions for his interest. In the work of art, the daydream is given form and an appearance of reality. The daydreams of the spectator are realised in the picture, the novel, the play.

There is, last of all, the REAL ACTIVITY. Man looks out from himself to the world, and sees it as well as he can. Then he begins the task of shaping

it according to his wishes. He harnesses the rivers, he makes the desert blossom. All that the daydreamer images, the practical man realises. What in the case of one man remains a daydream, what in another becomes a book or a picture, becomes in the case of this last an achievement.

Every achievement was a dream at first.

This does not mean that daydreaming of the type that is so common will necessarily lead on to achievement. As a rule, it does nothing of the kind. The person who daydreams a great deal is generally not aware that he wants any definite thing. All that he knows is that his daydreams are a great deal more pleasant than his work.

A great deal of the interest in spectacles—certainly the greater part, if not the whole—is closely related to the interest in the daydream.

When a general returns victorious from a campaign, and rides in triumph through a capital, crowds assemble to watch and to cheer him.

Shall we assume that each of the persons cheering has made an estimate of the precise value of the general's exploit? Shall we believe that each of the spectators has calculated exactly how much the victory has affected himself personally; how much the nation, and how much civilisation?

Shall we believe, on the other hand, that the man who chooses such a time to hurl a bomb at the hero of the moment has made a precise estimate of the value to civilisation of the removal of the general?

We know that the terrorist will endeavour to justify his action on the ground that tyrants will

behave better if they believe that their transgressions will be punished by swift and violent death.

This, however, seems, like cases we have already examined, to be AN EXCUSE RATHER THAN A REASON. We are inclined to look for something more personal.

What is the general to the man who kills him ?

What is the general to the man who cheers him ?

Far back in history, or even among primitive people in recent times, we should have been able very easily to account for the assassination. Then every king held his throne by the power he possessed to keep it. The man who could conquer succeeded him.

There can hardly be the same expectation in the mind of the terrorist. He can hardly believe that when he has killed the general, the people in the crowd will decorate his murderer, place him in the carriage, and continue the festivities according to programme, altered only by the change of hero.

He does not expect this. But it is a common sequel of such deeds, that the assassin does not attempt to escape. The circumstances of the assassination are such that he has no opportunity. He permits capture without resistance, he confesses his guilt, he goes without flinching to execution. His name is in all the papers. HE ATTAINS AS MUCH PUBLIC NOTICE AS HIS VICTIM, for the time being.

His pose throughout is heroic. Rather more like the pose of a stage hero, it is true, than that of a real one.

But amongst certain obscure brotherhoods, his name will for years be honoured as that of a martyr.

His portrait will hang in rooms where men meet furtively.

Such a man has decided to be a martyr. His interest in notoriety is greater than his interest in living.

Not all martyrs have died for great causes, or for the truth. Many have died for fame and notoriety.

The great lesson we learn from martyrs is that interest in being a hero in the eyes of others can be so intense that suffering and death seem insignificant.

Extreme types are instructive. They serve to illustrate points that we might easily overlook if we considered only ordinary types. They are like the diagrams that draughtsmen make to emphasise certain factors.

To the terrorist the successful public figure is a rival. He is a man who occupies that place in the public eye that is the other man's by right.

There is in the mind of the terrorist the interest in himself—the exaggerated, unreasonable direction of interest in the admiration and worship of other people. These are the things he craves.

He takes no constructive action towards securing them. He may not know how to do so. He may not wish to do so—since it is far easier to sit in a café and enjoy exaggerated daydreams. He may not have the ability to do so.

But there remains the intense desire for the great place in public notice, for adulation and fame. The more extravagant becomes the daydream the more striking is the difference between the state of things it represents and real life.

Most daydreams, as we have already said, end with a sigh. The extravagant daydream closes with a sigh, but it leaves behind it an aftertaste of disappointment, envy, bitterness and hatred.

When human beings indulge such feelings, they begin to try to make them reasonable. They invent excuses. The man who envies other human beings their place in the world's affairs and their share of the world's goods, invents strange philosophies and political beliefs to make his feelings appear right and reasonable.

Thus we find men who realise that no two puppies in a single litter are alike, believing that ALL MEN, whatever their birth or race, ARE EQUAL.

The notion of "justice" is perverted, too, in the endeavour to make the extravagant daydream, with its after longings, reasonable.

"Justice" becomes a scheme which would place the daydreamer where his daydream places him. "Injustice" is the actual state of affairs, which keeps him where he is so long as he remains what he is.

He talks excitedly of "liberty." He regards his present state as due to the wicked will of some oppressor. To justify himself he has to find an oppressor. That is easily arranged. Any prominent person will do. It may be a great political leader; it may be a financier; it may be a prince or a king or an emperor.

"Liberty" or "freedom" would, he imagines, rapidly put men and women in their right places. His own "right place," it goes without saying, is a lofty one.

He demands, we realise, that the whole world shall be upset. That other men and women shall be despoiled of whatever fortune or endeavour or natural superiority have brought them.

THE ONE FACT THAT HE REFUSES TO FACE IS THAT HIS DAYDREAM CAN BE REALISED ONLY BY DIRECTED EFFORT ON HIS OWN PART.

It is easier to adopt some fantastic political theory or an eccentric philosophy than it is to plan, and to act in accordance with the plan till it comes to fruition.

Here we meet with the solution of the problem : How comes it that intelligent men adopt and believe political, social and economic philosophies that cannot withstand a moment's criticism ?

The reply is that these men want the theory to be true, so strongly that they cannot take steps to disprove it. If we wish ardently for a certain thing, we can find reasons why we should have it. And we are unable to see the falseness of these reasons.

Enough time has been spent with the terrorist. It is time to return to the approving spectator.

This man sees himself in the hero.

In the daydream the daydreamer invariably beholds himself as the hero. Generally the presentation is frank and unmistakable. Sometimes it is a little disguised, but the briefest of examinations is sufficient to reveal that even so it is no exception. Its theme is invariably THE DAYDREAMER AS HERO.

So that any great spectacle, centring about an heroic figure, is the daydream made real for the time being.

The spectacle of a princess, passing in procession to the cathedral where she is to marry a noble lover, is a realisation of the daydream of the thousands of women who throng to watch.

There is a great display of emotion, a surge of feeling. The interest has become personal, in a way that is only explicable on the ground that the spectator identifies himself or herself with the central figure of the spectacle.

In such a spectacle men behold the bride of the daydream, the companion who has a place in romantic fantasies.

The masters of spectacular production realise that the spectacle itself may become wearisome. Huge crowds of people, moving rapidly, may tire. So that, invariably, the great producers continually keep in sight a purpose definitely and clearly related to the central figure of the hero.

The spectacle then acquires a meaning. It is a mass of men and women, animals and machines and structures—all related to a central heroic figure.

Since the heroic figure is the spectator himself, the crowd before him has assumed a personal aspect. It has become his. He feels emotion. Interest is directed outwards to the things seen.

The lesser producer has failed to grasp this. He gives us merely the masses of men and animals, the great buildings, the immense spaces. He overwhelms us. We tend to turn away from things that overwhelm us. O. Henry has illustrated this frivolously but profoundly—as his manner was—in a little story, *Psyche and the Pskyscraper*.

The immense thing impresses us in proportion to its size, perhaps. But it INTERESTS US ONLY TO THE EXTENT TO WHICH WE ARE ABLE TO MAKE IT OUR OWN.

The great man interests us emotionally, also, only to the extent to which we are able to make him ourselves, and his greatness our own greatness.

Chapter XI

BIAS

ALL men, and particularly those who hold responsible positions, depend very much for their success on their capacity for estimating correctly a situation.

It is perhaps impossible for any man to form an entirely impartial judgment. It is possible for a few men to arrive at what is nearly one. For the great majority, the task is all but impossible.

Prejudice affects all human judgment.

A man often says, "Let me tell you what I think," or "This is my opinion." What follows is neither a thought nor an opinion.

It is merely the statement of a prejudice.

Dickens has written of a gentleman who saw a reference to King Charles's head in everything that he heard or read. This particular gentleman was insane. He carried to excess, and in an unusual direction, a common human trait.

Is the enthusiast who sees "degeneracy" everywhere very different? The political crank who sees "tyranny" everywhere, is he different? Is the "anti-Semite" or the "anti-clerical" very different?

Are the majority of the vehement "anti's" and "ites" so very different, after all?

If you were to shoot a stream of iron filings forward with a high velocity, it would travel for some distance in a straight line. But if somewhere near the path along which they were to travel, you placed a powerful magnet, the filings would be deflected out of their path. They might go on, but the path would be changed.

If the magnet is on the left-hand side of the path, then some of the leftsidedness will be imposed on the movement of the filings.

It is quite common to meet a man who, so soon as we try to interest him in a new idea, enquires, " How much money is there in it ? "

His interest in money is a permanent one, that affects his interest in everything else.

Another man enquires, " But what is there for me in this ? "

By which question he means : " How could this be used to make me more important than I am ? "

It may be granted that these are very legitimate reasons in the first place for taking interest in a new proposition. If money be the end for which the man is working, he will first of all examine the new idea, to see how it can be made a part of his plans. Once the plans are formed, however, and the adoption of the idea is decided upon, the whole interest will be directed to the carrying out of the plan. The monetary result is bound up with the final achievement.

But there are people who will find that the question of money obtrudes itself over and over again in the course of carrying out the plans. It interferes with their work.

The interest in money is now felt, at this stage, as worry. Worry means that two interests are at cross purposes.

There are people who see critics of themselves everywhere. They feel compelled continually to adjust their hats and coats, to fidget with their ties—which they feel may be scaling the back of their collars or may have become twisted sideways.

Others are compelled to attempt to see their reflections in shop windows as they pass along the streets, in order to see that their appearance is normal.

They are, of course, acting without good reason. Other people are not criticising them. Other people are just not noticing them.

Nor, if they have taken ordinary pains in dressing themselves, are their ties misbehaving.

But the behaviour indicates an obsessive interest in themselves and their appearance.

It would seem absurd, at first sight, to say that these people "wished" that others would criticise them. They do not mean this at all by their conduct.

A critic must, however, take some notice, however slight, of that which he criticises. And all the fear of criticism, the anxiety lest something may be wrong, indicates an overwhelming interest in one's personal appearance.

The well-dressed man thinks about his personal appearance when he dresses. The man who worries about it thinks about it all day long.

The well-dressed man is able to go about his business without a thought about his appearance.

But the interest of the other man is deflected by it all day long—deflected from all the things that really matter by this one useless, futile interest.

There is said to be a cure for such worries, and you will find it set out in some of the many books that people kindly write to help us.

It is something like this: Tell yourself firmly that there is nothing to worry about. Keep on telling yourself this.

So the man will add to his worries this other: Am I telling myself firmly? Really firmly? Firmly enough? How can telling myself get rid of it? How long will it be before I am cured?

You try to cure a worry by worrying about the worry. It may succeed. It hardly seems likely.

In any case, the giving of such advice has removed financial worry from a number of the people who give it.

But any worry of this sort has a history behind it. In matters mental, as in matters bodily, WE ARE WHAT WE ARE BECAUSE OF WHAT WE WERE.

The interest in personal appearance that we are discussing goes back a long way. To be understood it has to be retraced step by step.

It will lead, if it be faithfully followed up, to the early years of childhood. It will lead to an episode in which personal appearance counted.

I have known of a case in which the origin appeared to be an accident, that resulted in a deep cut of the face, near to the eye.

Adults made the remarks that are usual on such occasions. They said, "Poor little girl! It will disfigure her for life."

The child understood the remark, and it gave her an unpleasant shock.

The mind of the child has a very simple way of dealing with many things that are unpleasant. It forgets them.

Some adults possess this power also. Others are tempted to envy them.

The child acts naturally in forgetting such things. Here nature works beneficially. For the child has not sufficient experience, and its powers of reasoning are not sufficiently developed, to permit it to deal adequately with the matter.

With an adult the case is altered.

The adult, with mature powers of reasoning and with a body of experience to guide him, is able to deal adequately with an unpleasant situation or experience. He is not only able, but HE MUST.

He cannot put the matter "out of his mind." If he should happen to forget it, it is still very much in his mind. It acts like the hidden magnet, deflecting all his interest from the directions which he wishes it to follow.

Whenever we find, therefore, the operation of a prejudice, a bias, that obtrudes itself into life, interfering with matters in which it can properly have no place, we must be prepared to find that something has, at some time or other, intentionally or unintentionally, been thrust "out of mind."

The early period of childhood is a time at which the foundations of such prejudices are most generally laid.

Early efforts to discipline the child are as a rule accompanied by experiences that are unpleasant.

The adult is inclined to believe that, if he explains matters in simple words to a child, the child can grasp the meaning. This is not the case.

To grasp the meaning it is necessary to possess reasoning powers that are similar to those of the adult, and to have passed through experiences that are similar to those which he has passed through. Experience and reasoning power are necessary preliminaries to understanding.

The child therefore may understand the words, but he is quite unable to grasp the idea which they are intended to convey.

As a result, a discipline that interferes with his wishes, sending him to bed when he wishes to continue playing, making him eat bread-and-butter when he wishes to eat cake, seems to him a tyranny.

Very often the disciplinary period follows sharply and suddenly a long period of indulgence.

The child can only regard the changed attitude of the parent with dismay, and wish for the return of the period when he was allowed full liberty—when none of his wishes was thwarted.

In cases where the experience was a great shock, the attitude towards anything that can be regarded as "tyranny" and the longing for "liberty" and "freedom" persist.

"Liberty" and "freedom" are more than mere words. They stand for great and lofty ideas. For their realisation great deeds have been performed.

But in the case of the people we are considering the words mean nothing great or fine. They mean nothing more than freedom from any restraint whatsoever. "Tyranny" is restraint.

Such prejudices may express themselves in many ways. There are men who see a tyrant in every policeman and official. There are those who see an attempt against their liberty in every traffic regulation. They may attempt to assassinate cabinet ministers; or they may make it a rule to walk on the wrong side of the road and to argue the point with anyone who happens to push against them.

There is only one way in which such prejudices can be dealt with. That is, to discover their history.

While they are out of mind they cannot be dealt with. They have to be discovered, and their origin made plain.

Then they have to be considered and understood in the light of experience and reason.

Until this has been done, they will remain as prejudices—unreasonable—deflecting interest from the directions it should follow.

They will continue to oppose all flow of interest outwards by a counter-current. They will obtrude themselves in disguised form into the whole of life.

They will interfere with the day's work and thought, with the night's sleep. At every moment they will be with us, thwarting every useful achievement by means of futile worry.

Chapter XII

DREAMS

OF late years, dreams have received a great deal of attention. This not merely from credulous people. Men and women of standing in the scientific world have written of them, after having studied them as they would have studied any other matter scientifically.

The conclusions are very many. All of them cannot be considered here. Some of them are so relevant to the matter of earlier chapters that they must be referred to.

In sleep all intentions, as we understand them in waking life, come to an end.

Sleep itself comes as a result of an abandonment, a giving up of oneself. The advice frequently given to children, "TRY to go to sleep," is futile.

So long as you "try" to do something, you remain awake.

Many things make it very clear to us, however, that life does not in any sense come to an end when sleep begins. The automatic movements of heart, lungs and the organs of digestion continue. Growth, waste and repair go on.

Speech and movement during sleep, dreaming and somnambulism make it clear that mental life has not ceased.

The life that we appear to live in the dream is so different from that which we live during the day, that children and simple people have always found it easy to believe that we do really leave this world in sleep, and wander to another.

The redskin found it easy to believe that he wandered during sleep to happy hunting-grounds, and that he returned the moment that he awakened. When he remained there and did not return, he was dead. In this way, sleep and death, which seem alike, were regarded as being alike. The whole was a simple argument from appearances.

There are some present-day views that are not so very different from this theory, though they are stated in a more imposing way. But scientists do not find it necessary to believe in a theory of another place to which some part of the mind wanders in sleep. They find the explanation in the activity of the mind itself.

Sleep is partial so far as the body goes. As a rule, the movements of walking, running, fighting, writing come to an end. The eye no longer sees, the ears no longer hear. But many activities go on precisely as if we were awake.

It is partial so far as the mind goes. Planning, thinking, judging, calculating come to an end. But some forms of activity remain at work.

The dream proves this.

If we take a single dream of our own, and consider it part by part, we shall be able to find each of these is connected with something that has occurred on the day of the dream or the day before.

The connection is sometimes very obvious. We

may take an item from the paper, or a picture from a poster—both things that we barely noticed.

The connection may be less obvious. For instance, the motto "Manners makyth man" occurring in the day's experience seems to have done a great deal in inspiring a dream in which Oxford and a tiny market town, Wickham, figured. "Manners makyth man" is the motto of Winchester College, founded by William of Wykeham, who is said to have been born at Wickham, and who founded New College, Oxford. These facts were known to the person who dreamed.

The connection of these matters with the events of the day has been made by means of memories. Memories apparently play a very important part in dreams. Memory would seem not to sleep.

It is interesting to take a single dream and to attempt to trace out all the connections with the events of the previous day or the day before that, or with memories connected with these.

It is necessary for this purpose to let the mind work as it does during sleep—that is, free of any attempt whatever of control, to allow ideas to come into the mind as they will. This is a deliberate process of mind-wandering.

When, however, the origin of the various parts of the dream has been discovered, we have not arrived at any sort of explanation of the dream.

If we were to know where every single bit of the material of a bird's nest came from, we should not know anything about the construction and purpose of the nest.

One thing of importance must be noticed, before we leave this part of the subject of dreams. This is THAT AS A RULE THE THINGS THAT THE DREAM HAS BEEN MADE FROM ARE NOT THE THINGS TO WHICH WE HAVE PAID GREAT ATTENTION DURING THE DAY. As a rule, they are the things that we have passed over with little or no deliberate attention.

In the second place, there has been a good deal of arrangement. The things of which I dream are not the things of the day, unaltered. I have placed them in other surroundings. I have added to them or taken away from them.

A novel is made up of the experiences of the novelist—either those which he has gone through himself, or those of others which he has read, experiencing them second-hand. But the novelist puts together things that never were together in real life. His scenes, his people are composites. He has blended many into a single one.

Why does he do this ?

The novelist works always towards an end, that comes out of a series of situations. The situations could not arise unless the characters were as he has conceived them.

The dream, too, seems to work also towards a situation. It is for this that it seems to be composed.

It is not always easy to see this end. The situation does not always come out very clearly. There are reasons for this, however.

The novelist has to work with his eye on the market. The majority of British novels end happily, because there is an idea that the public prefers

them to do so. Consequently the novelist often goes contrary to his own wishes.

The dreamer is in no such difficulty. The situations that arise in his dreams are, apparently, subject to his own control. The dream is a secret. There is no need to consider a possible public or audience.

But before the dream appears the work of selection of materials and of composition must be done. The dreamer does exactly what the novelist does, the difference being that he does it WITHOUT KNOWING IT.

The very fact that, during the day, when you had so much to think of, so many things to attend to, you could yet, without being aware of it, collect materials and compose them into dreams, proves, as clearly as anything could be proved, that the whole of your interest was not in your work, or the things of the real world.

Any consideration of the dream leads us to the conclusion that there is a residue of interest that we have not been able to employ.

It is interest that cannot find an outlet.

But it craves an object nevertheless. And since we have not provided for it a real one, it contents itself with an unreal one—one that it fabricates for itself out of the trifles of the day's life and out of connected memories.

It is all rather like a man who, craving for a life of adventure, sits in a theatre and watches "cowboy" films.

It might be thought that a study of the dream would therefore reveal to us at once the nature

of the interest that is not satisfied in the real world.

This is so. And this is the reason why so much attention is paid by modern physicians to dreams.

But here we meet with a difficulty.

So many ordinary dreams seem to be sheer nonsense. Others are about fearful or unpleasant situations. Others are mere muddles.

Are we therefore to assume an interest in nonsense, in fearful or unpleasant situations, or in muddles ?

Take, for instance, the common dream of being executed. Hundreds of people have experienced this dream.

Shall we say therefore that there is an interest in being executed ? That there exists a wish on the part of the dreamer to be executed ?

We can say nothing whatever about the dream till we know what ideas and memories are linked in the mind of the dreamer with execution. He could tell you what it means to him at the moment.

But he has had a very long life. He has had many ideas about executions in the course of it. The word itself has more than one meaning. All the meanings that he knows the word to possess, all the meanings that it has ever possessed for him, are somewhere in his mind. He may not be able to recall them if he " tries," but if he sits quiet, and allows his mind to " drift," he will find that a number of ideas come into his mind that he never knew that he had linked on to the idea of " execution."

An execution always follows a trial and a verdict of guilty. A trial follows an act.

The dream of an execution may therefore be taken to mean, on the surface, that an act has been committed by the dreamer, of a sort that is not looked upon favourably by his fellows.

Have none of us an interest in actions that we and all our fellows would agree that we should not do ? Are any of us free from such interest ?

Here, then, is a direction of interest revealed by the " execution " dream. We see why the crime we commit is seldom shown to us in the dream, since it is an act that we admit we should not do. It is, as a rule, an act that is anti-social or even immoral.

If, therefore, a part of our interest is fixed on things that are forbidden, it is unlikely that we shall admit even to ourselves that our interest is so fixed. In waking life we sternly repress such interest. In the dream we represent it in ways that keep it from being clear to us.

Civilisation has not provided outlets for all our interest. If we wish to overcome other people, the methods of the cave-man are forbidden to us. But we may still squeeze men out of the markets. We may outdo them in a number of ways. Outlets are provided, therefore, for such directions of interest.

It would be easy to find an expression for any interest. But against many expressions there have been erected barriers, by ourselves and by others. It is necessary to decent living that some barriers should be erected.

Until, however, we can find outlets for all our interest, that are such as to meet with the approval of ourselves and the community in which we live, there will be a residue of interest. The desires that are linked up with the instincts will be unfulfilled. Perhaps the word "desire" should not be used here, since we repress such interest so strongly that often we never know it, even as desire.

Although it is unable to express itself in waking life, it finds expression in the dream. As a result, we find in practice that all DREAMS EXPRESS THE REALISATION IN IMAGINATION OF UNFULFILLED AND REPRESSED WISHES.

Chapter XIII

MEMORY

THOUGHT, as we know it, is made possible only through memory.

Memory, as we use the word in general, means the capacity for recalling experiences.

But this is conscious memory only. Memory is really much more.

The single cell which has gone to the making of each of us underwent a whole series of changes, a series that is much more complex than that which the raw material of an industry goes through before it leaves the factory as a finished product.

We are compelled to believe that the result of many thousands—of millions, perhaps—of experiences have been impressed on the stuff of which the cell is made—so that it is able to behave as if it had itself been through all these experiences.

It has not been through them, itself, of course, but it behaves as if it had. It is permissible to speak therefore of a memory that has been handed down by heredity. If we use "ancestral memory" to mean this, no harm is done. But if we believe that we possess actual memories of experiences of our ancestors, so that we remember places that they

visited, or battles that they fought, we are going beyond what appear to be the facts.

We are born with brains that are able to remember, and so to enable us to live all our experiences over again.

This is something that brains have learned to do in the course of evolution. The brain of a man behaves as if it had actually learned this itself. It has not, of course.

It apparently, therefore, has had transmitted to it the memory of how remembering is done.

We do not know how the recording of memories occurs. We do know that a man who has passed through any experience whatsoever has been changed by it, however slightly.

A mind that has passed through an experience has been changed by it. In suitable circumstances, it is able to pass through the same inner experience, even in the absence of the outer part of the experience.

Thus I am able, in my own room, far away from water, to go again through all the sensations of a narrow escape from drowning. I am able to see again people who are at the other side of the world; people who are even dead.

It may be well to use a few terms in a definite way. Let us speak therefore of the original experience, of the recording, of the reproduction, and of the remembrance.

A man is said to have a good memory when his memory serves him readily with remembrances at the time that he wants them, not a few days later.

It seems proved, so far as such a matter can be proved, that every experience that we have passed through is recorded.

The actual experience of being born has been recorded, and can be recalled in special circumstances in many cases. It seems likely that experiences during life in the womb are also recorded.

Remembrances of these experiences are not possible of recall, as a rule.

We may speak therefore of two kinds of memories —those that can be recalled with little or no effort, and those that cannot be recalled without resort to special means.

The special means may be hypnotism or psychoanalysis.

But memories are not merely recorded in the mind by the brain. They are also organised into systems.

They may be badly organised or they may be well and efficiently organised.

The test of good organisation of memories is exactly the same as the test of a good filing system.

If a man boasts to me of his filing system, I do not inspect the drawers and cards and comment on their ingenuity and beauty. I ask him to find me a document.

If he finds it easily and quickly, the system is a good one. If he has to fumble about, or go through a number of complicated processes, then the system is a bad one.

If a man boasts of the way he remembers, I ask him to recall something. If he can do this easily and quickly, his memory is well organised. If he

has to hesitate and guess, or if he has to repeat rhymes and think of numbers, then his memory is not well organised.

We may make a further comparison of the memory with a filing system.

Before we can use a filing system at all, we must decide upon a BASIS OF CLASSIFICATION. Letters may be filed alphabetically according to the names of their writers; they may be filed according to the subjects with which they deal; they may be filed according to the towns from which they come; they may be filed according to the selling territory from which they have been sent—and so on. For particular purposes any one of these may be better than any other.

Generally speaking, a man finds it better, in using a filing system, to stick to a single system. Not to use two at once.

The mind seems to use two at once.

It is not easy to give names to these systems.

We might speak of the first of these as a feeling system.

That is to say, experiences have been classified according to the feelings they excited. We divide things, and experiences connected with things, into NICE things, NASTY things, EXCITING things, PLEASANT things, FEARFUL things, HORRIBLE things, HUMILIATING things—and so on.

This is not a very good classification. Nasty things might include together cheap shoes, slugs and "stewed" tea: things which have little in common with each other, except that we do not like them.

This is a way in which children group a great many of their experiences. It seems to be the way in which the memory behaves in great part, when it acts automatically.

Every day we direct our attention to a great many things that we wish to notice, and intend to remember. But we notice a great many other things without attempting to notice them, without directing our attention to them, and without any intention of remembering them.

However, we do remember them.

The brain records them and organises them; certainly mainly, and probably entirely, according to a FEELING system.

At all events, when we allow the mind to drift, permitting memories to follow each other without effort on our part, we shall discover that the experiences that we recall are linked together by common elements of feeling.

It is the same when we daydream. The memories that are used in the composition of the daydream are linked together in this particular way.

The same is true of the memories that are built up into our dreams.

But in our daily lives we do not want our recollections arranged according to such a system.

If we are trying to recall the names of people to whom we have to write, we do not want to proceed: "I must write to Jones. I hate Jones. And I hate Brown and Robinson, and cheap cigarettes, and wet Sundays, and red ties, and book agents."

We shall not get very far with our correspondence

if we have such a system of recollection to fall back upon.

There is, however, another system available. It is one which we have developed on account of the necessities of our existence. We tend to arrange our memories as if they were real things; as if they were the things themselves in place of mere shadows of them. We take into account the relations between the things themselves, as we have learned to know them.

Thus—iron is a metal. So also is copper. We shall remember iron and copper together in future, because they are both metals.

Iron is one of the ingredients of a tonic. Quinine is another, and strychnine another. We shall, when tonics come up for discussion, remember iron, quinine and strychnine together.

In the first case that we considered, memories were related together as they affect me, myself. We may speak of this as a SUBJECTIVE classification.

In the second case, however, it is the objects themselves, as I am able to know them, that have decided what relation shall exist between my memories of them. We may speak of this as an OBJECTIVE classification.

A great deal of our mental development is taken up with the business of reorganising our memories, in much the same way as a man reorganises his office, when he finds that the system at work is of little use to him.

This point will need further consideration.

Our memories may be compared to a great

number of people who crowd about an office, waiting for an interview with the man inside.

Only a few are admitted. These correspond to the memories that are in his mind at the moment. We call these the CONSCIOUS MEMORIES.

Outside, in an ante-room, others are waiting. They will be admitted to see him so soon as he wants them.

These correspond to the memories that are not conscious, but that will become conscious so soon as we wish them to be. We speak of these as the PRE-CONSCIOUS OR FORE-CONSCIOUS MEMORIES.

Outside the door, kept back by strong porters, are a number of people who wish to enter and to interview the chief, but who will not be allowed in on any account.

The chief will not want them, because he will not know that they are there.

Some of them have been in the ante-room, but have been thrown out.

Some have never been allowed to cross the threshold.

These correspond to what we call UNCONSCIOUS MEMORIES.

Why are they excluded ?

Who are the porters who keep them back ?

Why is the chief not permitted to know that they are there ?

These are questions that must be considered in time.

Chapter XIV

FORGETTING

EVERYBODY forgets things.

Consequently everybody, or nearly everybody, says that forgetting is "natural," and considers that there is nothing else to say about it.

Occasionally a man asks one, "Now why should I forget that?" He asks the question, but he does not expect an answer. It is reassuring to the man who forgets to be told by other people that they forget too; and as much as he does.

We forget a great many things that we should expect to forget. We forget Latin genders, and French verbs, and the dates when kings came to the throne of Britain, and all the other things that we learned as necessary to our full intellectual development in the days of our childhood.

Here we are able to assign a reason. These things never interested us very much; and we merely learned them because we "had to." Then again, their practical value is such that we have had no reason to recall them since leaving school.

These reasons appear to most of us to be sufficient to account for most of our forgetting.

But there are also forgettings that puzzle us a great deal at times. Some of us have an unaccountably wretched memory for names.

It is rarely a general failure. We are able to remember some names: others we invariably forget.

We cannot account for our failure. It seems capricious and unreasonable.

We have rules of a sort about the things we like and dislike. We have tastes which guide us in accepting and rejecting certain things. But forgetting appears to be without rules or preferences.

We meet Jones and Brown and Robinson, and recall their names without any difficulty whatever. We meet Kelly just as often, and never once can we remember his name until after we have left him.

If, however, we believe that memory has no rules, then we have to believe, since memory is the basis of all mental process, that no mental process whatsoever is reliable.

Our bodies occasionally fail us, when they are sick, or when we demand of them tasks which they cannot perform—are not constructed to perform. But we can rely on our bodies.

We can and do rely on our minds.

It looks very like sheer nonsense to write: WE FORGET BECAUSE WE REMEMBER SO WELL.

This seems, however, to be the fact.

There is a good deal of reason to believe that nothing that is experienced, thought, or felt, is ever forgotten.

Our memories extend back into the years of childhood.

We remember childish experiences of falling, of fears, of caresses. To some extent, it seems, we remember the fact of birth. To some extent, it

seems, we remember the life that we lived before birth : whilst we were still in the womb.

The statement needs a little qualifying.

It must not be taken to mean that there are recorded in our minds all the facts about birth that we should find in a medical textbook. It means that at that time we had some capacity for sensation and feeling, and that the sensations and feelings we experienced were recorded.

These memories can be recovered. A subject under hypnotism, or one undergoing psycho-analysis, will remember many things that had apparently passed for ever from his memory.

All of us have a mass of buried memories, which we cannot recover without assistance.

Most of us are familiar with the process of half-remembering. A word, a picture, a scene, makes us nearly remember something. Almost we remember. Then the memory, that has nearly struggled into consciousness, takes flight.

How are we to explain forgetting ?

Is the brain something like a dictaphone record, periodically scraped of the older things that are impressed on it, so that new records may be made ?

Hardly, because it is by no means the older things that are forgotten. I remember much that happened to me when I was four years of age. Many things that happened yesterday I have already forgotten.

Is it that some impressions are deeper than others ? This may be true.

But, if true, it does not account for forgetting. It is a common experience that great and important

matters are forgotten, whilst unimportant ones are remembered.

There are many recorded cases of men and women who have passed through great emotional crises, and have afterwards forgotten them completely. But their memory for ordinary and for trivial things remained.

The explanations that would naturally occur fail. They do not explain forgetting.

We get no clue till we begin to examine definite instances of forgetting.

No rule can be given as to why people forget names, for example. But it can soon be dicovered, by an examination of a particular man who forgets certain names, why he forgets them.

The forgetting is an individual thing. It can only be explained in the light of a knowledge of the individual.

It will be discovered, that so soon as the mind is allowed to " wander " from the subject of what is forgotten, freely and without any restraint whatsoever, the wandering leads to something that is uncomfortable. Either this, or to a blank.

It is difficult to discuss this at all without giving examples, and it is difficult to use examples without running the risk of misleading.

In the case of one particular man who has a very bad memory for names, and who can seldom recall a name without very considerable effort, the first thing that comes to his mind when he allows it to " drift " is the subject of his own name.

He remembers that he has a strong dislike of

his own name—names, rather, since he dislikes both his Christian name and his surname.

He remembers that, as a boy at school, he underwent a good deal of annoyance because his schoolfellows used to make fun of his name.

As he allows his mind to "drift," he remembers a great number of occasions on which he underwent these petty persecutions.

His surname recalls his father. Then there come to mind a number of occasions of difference with his father. The two were frequently at cross purposes. There was little sympathy between them.

The process goes on apparently endlessly. What is interesting is that practically all the memories that have been unearthed in this way—apparently for the first time since the events occurred—have been unpleasant ones. They centre around all sorts of humiliations connected with the name.

We know that we find it easier to remember our successes than our failures. The man of whom the preceding paragraphs are true has remembered often the occasions on which he was praised at school, the occasions on which he received prizes or rewards; but he has now, for the first time for years, remembered the humiliations.

Why should this be so?

The first business of an organism is to live and to progress. In the light of our successes we go forward. In the light of our failures we stop or go back. It may be important that we should learn some degree of caution from our failures, but it is much more important that we should learn from our successes to go forward.

Failures can only teach us the right kind and degree of caution if we understand them. Understanding does not mean worrying. It does not mean pretending to ourselves that our failures were successes. It does not mean living them over and over again, and growing to enjoy them—calling our enjoyment of them "humility"—whereas it is nothing of the kind.

It means reviving the experience, and examining it, with or without assistance, exactly as if it were a business proposition. The personal prejudice has to stand aside.

It is this personal prejudice that makes it so easy to forget, so difficult to remember. All the experiences that tell against our pride and prejudice are pushed out of consciousness; exactly as a censor blacks out of a newspaper all the uncomfortable truths that it contains.

Nietzsche has summed the matter in an epigram:

"'I did that,' says my memory. 'I could not have done that,' says my pride. Finally—memory yields."

So, in the case that has been referred to, the drifting of memory shows that names are linked up into a system—a "feeling" system, as we called it in the last chapter, of humiliations and other unpleasant experiences, that personal prejudice is attempting to push out of consciousness.

Names belong to this system. So they are forgotten also.

But why does one's own name not go also.

Because ordinary life makes that impossible, as a general rule. But there are numerous cases in

which the memory of one's own name has been lost. With it has gone, too, the memory of wife and children, address and occupation.

It would be too much, at present, to say that this explanation covers all cases of forgetting. It is impossible to prove that anything is true of ALL CASES.

It explains a great deal, however, that seemed to defy explanation. Further, it points the way to a cure. This cure is to face the things that personal prejudice forbids us to face. To recover and to deal with the things that we have apparently forgotten because we would not face them.

To take the memories that are still filed in "feeling" systems, and to reorganise them into "thought" systems—to deal with them objectively, rather than subjectively. In this lies the cure.

Chapter XV

REPRESSION

IN the previous chapter, where forgetting was discussed, we met with the idea that the mind itself, or at least some part of it, was actively trying to keep out of consciousness the memory of unpleasant things.

We compared this process to the operations of a censor. The comparison was made in the first instance by Freud, the physician whose work has made possible very great advances in the study of the mind.

It is very important to realise that this process is an automatic one.

It goes on quite apart from our will.

We find that, when we exert all our will in the endeavour to forget something, all that we succeed in doing is remembering the matter more strongly than ever.

All automatic processes have been developed in the course of ages for the benefit of the organism. It is always possible, however, for the organism to change its mode of life and to find some of its automatic habits rather a nuisance.

Savage man, for instance, spits on the ground whenever he is bothered with an excess of saliva. None of his neighbours raises any objection, and

in the free open air it is hardly possible for harm to be done. In any case, neither he nor his fellows imagines that any harm can follow.

But so soon as he begins to live in houses, with carpets on the floor, the automatic habit becomes a nuisance. When it is discovered that dangerous germs are conveyed by spitting, men attempt to put an end to the practice, not only in houses, but in the streets as well.

We find, in the course of civilised life, that we have sternly to repress a great many activities that would be carried out automatically by our bodies unless we interfered; exercising our will to prevent them from being carried out.

The automatic habits are so strong, as a rule, that we are only very partially successful in our attempts at control.

The reason of our failure is clear.

The formation of the automatic habits has been going on for countless years. Our attempts at control extend over a few generations only.

The putting out of mind of unpleasant experiences is one of these automatic habits.

It is one that has been of great value to the race. It has allowed hopes to live on, and fears to be forgotten. It has enabled optimism to triumph over pessimism in the human mind.

The optimism has not been the cheap kind that is so popular to-day. It has not been the optimism that has said: "Everything must come right. We have only to wait."

It has been the optimism that has said: "We have worked hard and succeeded before. We shall

do so again." And this optimism has been easier for men, since the failures have been, in great part, forgotten.

The consciousness of man has been like the sundial, that recorded only the hours that were sunny.

But the circumstances of men have changed a good deal since the habit was formed. Like other habits, it is now often a nuisance.

Moreover, in place of growing weaker, it has most probably become stronger.

Life is much more complex, for one thing.

We are much more complex, mentally, than the animals from which we have descended.

It is possible to humiliate a dog. But a man may be humiliated more easily, and in a greater variety of ways.

Man has developed a number of prejudices. There are those which we may term "natural" ones, which arise from the fact that he is a man. But he has developed others which have arisen from the fact that he belongs to a certain race, a certain nation, a certain social caste, a certain family. He has other prejudices due to his education, his ethical standards, his religious creed—and many more. All these increase the number of things THAT ARE UNPLEASANT, OR EVEN REPULSIVE, TO HIM.

A prejudice always means a refusal to discuss seriously a number of matters. It implies that the matter has been "judged"—if the word can be used—without discussion or examination. It means that a decision has been arrived at, without examina-

tion or discussion or comparison with previous experience.

A prejudice may carry a man very far, if he has to deal only with situations of the same kind. A savage has a prejudice against strangers, and has a tendency to shoot them at sight. The value of this, in the conditions under which the savage lives, is apparent.

But directly the situation changes, ever so slightly, the prejudice loses its value. Savages doubtless preserved their lives and their culture unharmed by their salutary habit of shooting all strangers, so long as these strangers were members of other tribes.

When Europeans came, the case was altered. The habit, in many cases, led to extermination.

Civilised life, as we live it nowadays, is continually changing. We cannot meet its demands completely if we have merely a number of automatic habits. Conditions continually arise in which the operation of these habits leads to failure.

Progress has very many critics. The bulk of these are people who are trying to meet changing conditions with prejudices which fail them.

The demand that progress shall cease is the demand that the world shall remain suited to the prejudices of people who have little other equipment.

The automatic pushing out of consciousness of memories is spoken of as "repression." The automatic nature of the process must be insisted upon. "Repression" is not carried out by an act of the will.

Although the memories that are repressed are disliked by our prejudices, it does not follow that they are not such as interest us. Many of the things that we suppress are things that would directly gratify our instincts.

Regarding them, therefore, we are divided. One part of us wants them, the other disowns them and will have nothing to do with them. If we could disarm our prejudices, then these memories could come into our minds. We might then begin to think thoughts that are impossible to us at other times.

This is exactly what some drugs allow to occur. They weaken all the forces of our minds that automatically repress memories and thoughts that are repugnant to us at times when we are in full possession of our minds.

In vino veritas is an old saying. When a man is drunken, we hear from him the things that are kept secret, not only from other men, but from himself.

In the mass of memories that are repressed we have material that is of great importance to the instincts that we cannot, or do not, gratify in ordinary life.

The interest that is bound up with the instincts that can find no expression is able to use these buried memories. From them it fashions dreams and daydreams.

When memories are buried deeply because they are very repugnant to our consciousness, they are not used in the manufacture of dreams or daydreams. A memory that is closely linked up with

them, and which is not particularly repugnant, is used in its place.

In this way, the instincts that are not expressed in real life find expression. They take our attention from our work. They defeat our will. They achieve their end most easily when we are fatigued or ill. They achieve their end when we sleep or when we are listless.

It is from such considerations that we arrive at the conclusion that DREAMS ARE THE FULFILMENT OF WISHES THAT ARE REPRESSED.

It is from such considerations, also, that we arrive at the conclusion that there is a war going on continually within ourselves between the forces of repression and our own instincts.

The result of a war depends upon the relative strengths of the opposed forces.

Whilst the repressing forces are superior to the force of the interest that is bound up with the repressed tendencies, then we shall find that we are able to carry on our work in the world.

If the forces are pretty evenly matched, so that victory goes, now to one side, now to the other, we shall find that there are periods when we can do our work quite well, alternating with periods when we cannot attend to it at all.

If the interest bound up with the repressed instincts is the stronger, then work becomes impossible. We have the condition of the man who sits before work to which he cannot attend—the man who cannot concentrate, who cannot arrive at decisions.

There is an outlet by means of which a man

can give way on this point and retain his self-respect. He may even gain increased respect from his fellows.

HE MAY BECOME ILL.

Every organ is sound. But for the time being, certain organs refuse to work properly. We speak of a functional disorder or disease.

It may be blindness, or deafness, or stomach trouble, or heart trouble. It may take the vaguer and more general form of " nervous breakdown."

The man is able to say of himself, " I cannot work, because I am ill." His colleagues will say of him, " He has been over-working. He is so conscientious."

The man is miserable and uncomfortable. His business is going to pieces. He has to leave undone many things that he wants to do. But through the illness, his repressed instincts with the interest bound up with them have gained their point.

The man has been taken away from the work which afforded no outlet for the repressed instincts. His interest has been withdrawn from his business and is centred in himself. People are greatly interested in him : they wait on him, they enquire after him.

The illness, like the dream, is a fulfilment of a repressed wish.

The man is pretending nothing. The illness is as real to him, and as unpleasant, as if his organs were really injured.

The whole process is automatic, and is " nature's way " of dealing with a situation.

To civilised men it seems a troublesome and

unnecessary way. But the automatic habit was not devised in or for civilised man.

In the course of the war of 1914–1919, many soldiers who repressed their fears of a situation where fear was excusable developed illness that necessitated their removal from the front to the base or even to England.

At first it was thought that these men were malingering. Now it is understood that an automatic process, that the men could not control, had come into operation.

" War shock " and the everyday " nervous breakdown " have a great deal in common.

Chapter XVI

PERSONALITY

WHEN we realise that, in addition to the body of wishes and plans and desires and activities that makes up the man that all our friends know, there is another body of wishes and memories that are at war with these, a question comes to mind at once.

Which of these is ourselves ?

The question is inevitable, so soon as we see clearly that we are more than one.

It is not possible to give a single definite answer.

A few years ago a great deal of attention was directed to cases of " multiple personality."

One case can be given in outline. It is typical, since all other cases more or less closely resemble it.

A young woman, educated on rigidly puritan lines, and hating any conduct that could be regarded as loose or " fast," walked from her home to the porch of an hotel, where the " fast " young men of the town used to congregate.

Her glances in the direction of one of these were so inviting, that he spoke to her. Finally she consented to allow him to take her for a drive, alone, in his car on the following day.

When the young man called on the next afternoon, she denied having made any arrangement

with him. He was angry, and said what he thought about the matter. She was annoyed and humiliated that he should believe her capable of such conduct.

SHE HAD ENTIRELY FORGOTTEN THE MATTER.

On more than one occasion, she woke with the taste of tobacco in her mouth; and feeling sick and ill from it. On the table at the bedside were the ends of cigarettes. She was in her waking hours a strong anti-tobacco propagandist. The idea of women smoking was particularly repugnant to her.

She had no recollection of getting the cigarettes, or of smoking them.

We may agree that such a state as this is not normal. We shall regard it as a "diseased state," bordering on insanity.

Here are two persons: one a rigid puritan; the other not.

Which of the two is the real woman?

The answer is, of course, neither.

She maintains her rigid puritanism only by the rigorous repression of a body of wishes, which are a part of her total personality. These are denied recognition, are pushed out of conscious memory.

In an earlier chapter we spoke of would-be interviewers, who are thrust out into the street. The man in the office does not know that they are there, so faithfully do his doorkeepers do their work.

But, when the number has become great, these people begin to unite. They have a common purpose, which is to make the man in the office hear them, and to act as they wish him to act.

They will make a great deal of noise. In the central office there will be heard a murmur, which may or may not be understood.

If, however, the crowd becomes greater, and its sense of grievance becomes stronger, the men may overpower the doorkeepers. They may rush through the ante-rooms and storm the inner office.

They may hold up the man there and compel him to grant their wishes.

The struggle may be a brief one. He may yield to them, and allow them to go away. Then he may strengthen his doors, add to the number of his doorkeepers, and go on as he used to do.

He may give way to them in parts. He may admit the justice of their claims, and consider how their wishes may be reconciled with his own.

There is another possibility. The men who stormed the office may take permanent possession of it, and proceed to carry out their own wishes completely, regardless of what the owner proposed to do.

We see all these stages in human revolutions. We see their parallels in human personality.

In the case of the girl already referred to, we see revolution alternating with counter-revolution. The counter-revolution is made easier by the fact that the incidents of the revolution have been forgotten.

The girl is very much in the position of the autocrat who cannot see the disaffection in his domains, and who is therefore able to persist in conduct that will certainly bring about a revolt.

Such considerations enable us to see in the

daydream a revolt. Certain interest, which is not allowed expression in one's business or occupation, breaks through, interrupting the work until it has secured some measure of gratification.

The remedy is obviously the gratification of interest. A full life is one in which all the instincts find expression.

A suggestion such as this is vague. It helps very little. It seems to suggest, too, things that it need not mean or imply.

It does not mean that girls with a puritan bias should wink at men in hotel porches, or should go for unchaperoned drives in autos with "fast" young men. Or that they should smoke cigarettes if they do not like them.

It does mean, however, that all these things are expressions of a side of life that this girl is ignoring. They are very obvious and very immediate and readily accessible means of gaiety.

Her puritanism, too, is almost entirely of the brand that makes a great deal of the things that you do not do. It has a great many "Thou shalt not's" about it, and hardly a single "I shall."

It is not a virtue to have no vices, just as it is not a vice to have no virtues.

Virtue and vice are positive things.

The instincts are not in themselves good or bad. They are essential to life. They are the foundation of all conduct, good or evil.

Steel may be used for making table knives or swords.

The instincts may be guided to conduct that is of value; that conserves life and makes it fine

and noble. They may be guided to conduct that degrades life, that makes it gross and animal, that leads to disease and death.

The first is virtue. The second is vice.

Every specialist—and in a civilised community we are all of us, in greater or less degree, specialists—runs the risk of ignoring some of his instincts. Every specialist runs the risk of living a life that is narrow.

And since we must be specialists so far as our work goes, there is need of other activities, not running counter to our work, but supplementing it, to make life full.

We find these in play and hobbies.

The best hobbies and play are not those which are deliberately chosen. They are those to which we feel impelled. Our interest in them is the guide.

The man who plays golf because golf is recommended to him, or tennis because his neighbours play it, will hardly get the results from these that he would get from something that appeals strongly to him for its own sake.

The man who takes up a certain hobby because he thinks it might do his heart or his stomach good, or because it will take him into the open air, is taking it up for good reasons—but not FOR THE BEST REASONS.

The best reason is that it interests him strongly and makes his life more complete.

It may happen, and sometimes does, that a man finds that his daily occupation fills his life, and leaves him with no residue of unsatisfied interests. Such a man is more fortunate than most.

There is the familiar story of the old London busdriver, who, having a holiday, spent it in riding round on the top of his own bus. And there is, again, the equally well-known one of the rural postman who spent his holidays walking round with his deputy.

At the other extremity we have the men whose one desire is to " get away from their work." They ask no more of a hobby or recreation than that it should take them completely away from their work. The man who feels like this about matters would do well, in the long run, if it can possibly be managed, to find other work altogether ; to do something from which he does not always wish to escape.

Most of us have to be content, however, to do work that gives expression to a part only of our interest, and to discover in hobbies and play and home life means of expressing the residue.

And in this way we make life complete.

It would be ideal if we could discover a single outlet for the whole of our energies and our interest. Then our efforts would be undivided, concentrated, rather than scattered. But, failing this, we have to be content with a few outlets—our jobs, our homes and our hobbies.

If we can succeed in utilising these for the purpose of expressing the whole of our interest, for the purpose of giving expression to the whole of our instincts, we shall have gone far towards developing a single personality, different in kind from the cases we have been compelled to consider.

And with such utilisation of interest there will

come happiness and gaiety. For the origin of worry and of anxiety is to be found in a baffled instinct, in the struggle between instincts and the forces that are repressing them. This is the origin of bad temper and of anger.

The sources of good temper and cheerfulness are to be discovered in the expression of the instinctive tendencies.

Chapter XVII

FEARS

THERE are a number of occasions on which fear may be rightly felt.

Fear is the emotion that goes with the expression of the instinct to fly or to conceal oneself. This is the preservative instinct that comes into operation in presence of an enemy, or in a situation that is full of danger.

Its value to the race is apparent.

Animals that never in any circumstances felt fear and ran away—if there were ever such—paid the penalty with their lives. Only those who ran away on appropriate occasions survived, and left descendants.

But there are many persons who go through life feeling unreasonable fears. The feeling is at times so strong, that they show it, even at the risk of a good deal of humiliation.

It is said of the late Lord Roberts that he was afraid in the presence of a cat. In his lifetime Lord Roberts had a good many personal opponents. But none of them ever accused him of cowardice. His army career, and his public career afterwards, proved him an exceptionally brave man.

The behaviour of a woman in the presence of a mouse has long been a subject of jokes.

There is something laughable in the spectacle of a strong, athletic woman jumping on a table or a chair, and shrieking with fear, in terror of a little creature which she could crush with a foot.

The one person who does not find it laughable is the woman herself.

You may tell her that her fear is unreasonable. She knows this already.

You may tell her that the mouse cannot harm her. She knows it as well as you do.

You may tell her that she could easily kill the mouse if she tried. She knows this.

You may tell her that she is making herself ridiculous. Of this she is only too well aware.

When the mouse escapes, or is driven away or killed, and the woman ventures to climb down from her post, it is easy to see by her distress that the fear has been a very real one. There is no pretence whatever about it.

It is difficult to understand. We feel that we cannot explain it. So we dismiss it with an epithet, which is the usual way of dealing with things that are not understood. We say it is "natural," or we say it is "silly."

Some people retain, even when grown up, the childish terror of the dark. Some fear lifts, tubes and caves. Some have a horror of tiny rooms. Others cannot endure open spaces or large halls. Some have a horror of loneliness, and some cannot endure a crowd.

Are these less difficult to understand, or less absurd, than the woman's fear of the mouse?

Other men have a terror of responsibility. They

are able to carry on quite well with a job until they know that they are responsible for its being done well. Then they begin to bungle it.

The particular fears with which we are dealing differ from ordinary fear in that there is NO ADEQUATE GROUND OF FEAR.

If a tiger entered a room in which ladies were sitting, we should expect them to scurry. Here there is an adequate ground of fear.

When, however, the intruder is a mouse, the case is very different.

It is very likely that simple fear, that accompanies running away, is not nearly so painful as the fear that we are considering at the moment.

Travellers have told us how natives, swimming in the water and disturbed by a shark, swim away in great terror. But a moment after, so soon as they are safe, they are laughing and chattering gaily: even though one of their number may have been killed.

In the war of 1914–1919, pure fear of this character was seldom seen. Military law makes running away a good deal more dangerous than keeping right on.

As a consequence the soldier who felt fear at all experienced a very complicated fear. He was afraid of the situation. He was afraid of yielding to his fear. He was afraid to show or to speak of his fear, lest he should excite the ridicule of his companions. He was afraid to admit the fear to himself, often enough, lest he should feel ashamed of himself.

It is clear that his mind is in a state of turmoil.

He wishes to go on—he wishes to go back: and these at the same time. He wishes to speak to his comrades of his fears, as men wish to confide in others at all times—he wishes to hide his fears: and these contrary wishes are wished at the same time.

It is at such moments that the mind is torn between conflicting desires. Men felt these things, and still went on—because there were forces at work in their minds that enabled one part to conquer the other.

Sometimes the mind gave way under the strain. The giving way was spoken of as " war shock."

One German N.C.O.'s case illustrates the matter very well. He gave orders to his men that they were not to fire. He pointed out that the men in the enemy trenches had wives and children, and that their deaths would bring sorrow and hardship. Therefore the men must not be fired upon.

In this particular roundabout way he expresses his fears of his own safety. It is himself, his own wife and his own children of whom he thinks. But in his expression of his fears—which, as a soldier and a non-commissioned officer, he may not directly express—he speaks of the safety of others.

Towards these others he has two sets of wishes. As an enemy soldier, he wishes their destruction. But when he thinks of them as like himself, he wishes their safety. The latter wish is made stronger by his own fear, which may not be expressed—but which must be repressed. And so this wish wins at the end of the conflict.

The mental state that follows brings about the

desired safety. The man is removed to a hospital far from the firing line.

Can we speak of a mental conflict that is centred in a mouse? Hardly.

But suppose that the mouse stands for something that it is not.

When a Prime Minister says, "We will never sheathe the sword," nobody takes his words to apply to a sword. When we call a politician a fire-eater, nobody imagines that we are making a literal statement, and that the man really does perform the trick of eating fire—or pretending to eat it.

This is what appears to be true in connection with the fear of the mouse.

The woman is not afraid of the mouse. But the mouse represents something, other than itself, about which she is in a state of mental conflict.

It stands for something which she desires, and which is repugnant to her. One of these two attitudes, the desire, has been repressed.

But it is quite common to hear a person say that he can explain the fear easily enough. Once upon a time, he was frightened by such an animal. A man will explain a morbid terror of rats by the fact that he was nearly bitten by one when he was three or four years of age.

The explanation is good so far as it goes, but it is only a part of an explanation. Other things frightened him too, and apparently quite as much —trains and policemen and dogs. For none of these does he now feel fear.

The memory of the mouse episode or experience has been linked on to one of the "feeling" systems

of memories in which also is the memory of the thing about which there really is a conflict.

The sight of the mouse sets the whole chain of memories in motion. They attempt to come into the mind. There is a struggle, a violent conflict —which is not really about the mouse, BUT WHICH HAS BEEN PROVOKED BY THE MOUSE.

This view seems less difficult to believe if we recall that in the dream we used a number of unimportant occurrences to compose a story about something that really mattered—and that the dream was never about what seemed to be its subject.

What is really feared under the form of a mouse, a cat, a bird, an open space, a tunnel ?

To this question no single answer can be given. The answer is a personal, an individual one.

What is really feared can be discovered only from the person who fears. It can be discovered by the method of examination of which we have already spoken in connection with the dream—the method of " free association."

The mind drifts on from " mouse " or " cat " to other things—to many other things. It leads on and on, probably at the end to a blank, to a point where the man says, " I can think of nothing. Nothing comes into my mind."

At the other side of the blank the solution waits.

The fear has been completely dissipated when all its origins have been completely understood, since then the situation has been consciously faced. The memories have been reorganised.

It can be dispelled by suggestion. But this is no radical cure. Suggestion can attack the fear

itself only. What is likely to occur if the fear (which is, after all, only an expression of a conflict) is dispelled, whilst the conflict is left unsolved, is that another expression of the conflict may come into being.

This may be a less uncomfortable one. It may, on the other hand, be a much more uncomfortable one.

In which case the subject merely deserts the frying-pan for the fire.

Chapter XVIII

SYMBOLS

IN the last chapter we had to speak of fears.

We discovered that the things that were feared stood for something else. This is, at least, a possible explanation. Unless we believe this, it is extremely difficult to account for the fear.

Now a cross, for example, does not stand for merely what it is. Really it is merely two strips of material crossing each other at an angle. It was formerly used as a means of execution. And so on. One might go on at great length.

But at present, with us, it stands for the Christian religion. Where we see the cross, we infer the presence of a building consecrated to Christian worship.

Here is an instance, then, of an object that possesses meaning.

Another instance is the masonic badge that a man wears on his watch-chain, or the sign of rank that a soldier or sailor carries on his uniform.

When we referred to the fear of a mouse, we spoke of the reasons for believing that the mouse stands for much more. Here, then, the mouse is like the badge of rank.

THE DIFFERENCE IS THIS: IN THE CASE OF THE BADGE, WE KNOW WHAT IT STANDS FOR. BUT THE

WOMAN WHO FEARS A MOUSE DOES NOT KNOW FOR WHAT IT STANDS.

She is affected by it, as if it were something extremely important and terrible. But what this something terrible is—this something for which the mouse stands—she does not know.

We have all been at some time or other profoundly impressed by a piece of music, a moment in a play or a novel, a picture, a landscape, and we have not known why. We have tried to explain, and we have realised, as we tried, that our words did not in the least express our meaning, or account in the least for the emotion that we felt. We have said that the matter "meant a great deal" to us, but we have been unable to say what it meant.

To make discussion of the point easier, let us say the cross possesses "meaning," and that the thing which affects us profoundly without our knowing why possesses "significance." And let us speak—following some of the modern authorities on the subject—of the things that possess a meaning as "emblems," and the things that possess significance as "symbols."

It is not always easy to draw a hard and fast line between the two. In fact, a single object may be both. This is often the case.

If in real life, we are confronted by an emblem, we pay enough attention to it to recognise it. Then, unless we have some particular interest in the matter, our attention is withdrawn from it.

If I see a masonic emblem on a man's watch-chain, I say, "I suppose he is a mason." If I, too, am a mason, I am probably further interested.

Otherwise, I have no more interest in the matter, once I have recognised the emblem.

The appeal is not a deep one. My curiosity is stimulated for a moment, is satisfied by the recollection of the meaning, and disappears.

The appeal of the symbol is deeper. It stirs the feelings. It haunts for a long time. We endeavour to give a meaning to it—and fail. We return to look at it again and again, and every time the feelings are stirred. Every time we are baffled.

For most people a bird is a symbol. Of what? That, indeed, it is impossible to say.

Maeterlinck used "The Blue Bird" as the title of one of his most successful plays. It was explained that the blue bird meant happiness. That does not make the matter much clearer, since none of us is capable of saying very clearly what happiness means. But the idea stirs us deeply.

Ethel Dell's best-known book—one that has sold extremely well, and has been dramatised and filmed—was named *The Way of an Eagle*. The title compelled interest. People discovered themselves wanting to know what it meant.

It was not merely that the title was a puzzle. A title that is a puzzle is not enough to attract attention or hold interest. THE PUZZLE MUST BE ONE THAT PEOPLE FEEL COMPELLED TO TRY TO SOLVE. Everything that is a symbol for us is such a puzzle.

The trade-mark of the "Swan" has sold a good many fountain pens. It is not suggested that there is no backing up of the trade-mark in the quality of the pen. All that is suggested is that the trade-mark is in itself valuable publicity material.

A very great number of successful poster advertisements and trade-marks contain materials that a psychologist recognises at once as symbols, similar to those that he discovers in dreams and other material which he is in the habit of analysing.

The point is so important that it cannot be ignored.

Any attempt to explain the principles that underlie successful publicity that does not take into account the appeal of symbols is merely a superficial and partial one.

It is very important that a poster shall be striking, arresting, well-printed, artistically designed, and well displayed. But all these things affect only the manner of the poster.

The matter must be such as shall hold the attention that has been attracted by the manner of the poster's execution and display.

Of all such possible matter the symbol is the most effective.

Since, however, the attempt is made to appeal to great masses of people, it is necessary to choose symbols that are symbols for great numbers of people.

To return again to the mouse. The fact that fear of the mouse is very common amongst women, and that therefore a mouse is for many women a symbol, would mean that many women would be affected by a picture that made use of a mouse.

One firm has made use of the symbol.

It has represented a lady, mounted on a chair, displaying rather more hosiery than would be shown in walking. The firm uses this poster to advertise silk stockings.

Such a poster arouses more interest amongst women for whom the mouse is a symbol, for whom it possesses significance, than would a matter-of fact illustration, with letterpress mentioning selling points.

On the other hand, since the fear of mice is not common amongst men for whom a mouse is a tiny animal and nothing more, a similar appeal intended for men would not be likely to be very successful.

A picture, for instance, of a man mounted on a chair because there was a mouse on the floor, and displaying somebody's shoes, would hardly be likely to effect sales.

Again, it is possible that even the use of this particular symbol in connection with women's wear is not the best possible form of publicity, since the emotions stirred up by the mouse are not pleasant ones. Best or not, it is certainly good, since it does stir deeply—more deeply than mere matter-of-fact presentation.

In the case of the mouse, we have a creature that stands as a symbol for large numbers of women, but for very few men.

Cricket is a symbol for many public-school men. To them it is more than an exercise or a game. It stirs them profoundly, and when they attempt to assign a meaning in words, they fail and know that they fail.

But since the majority of men are not and cannot be public-school men, cricket is not a general or universal symbol.

Books are a symbol for a limited number of men.

These accumulate books that they will never read. They continually add to their store. They feel very bitterly any necessity for parting with their books. They hate lending them.

In attempting to describe their relation to their books, we have to use a term which refers to emotion. We do not say they use books, or that they read books, or that they deal in books. We say that they LOVE books.

Pictures of books, of libraries or of bookshelves would possess great significance for such people. But here again, since there are so few of them, such appeals cannot be of use with a general public.

Is it possible to find objects that serve as symbols for great numbers of people? Objects, that is, that stir great numbers of people—that possess significance for them?

It appears to be possible. The accumulated experience of psycho-analysts points to the existence of a number of such objects.

Some of these are: Birds, the sea, waterfalls, mountains, rounded hills, towers, domes, mirrors, vases, cafés, theatres, pillars, roses, gardens, trees, butterflies, seashells, clowns, masks, horses, bulls, lions, dogs, cats, monkeys, teeth, eyes, hair, hats, boxes, sailors, life-belts, pens, rivers, lakes. The list might be indefinitely extended.

Every successful poster contains a symbol or a set of symbols. ON THIS FACT THE POSTER DEPENDS FOR THE INTEREST IT EXCITES.

The object of artistic composition is to place the symbols in groupings and settings that enhance their appeal.

The object of novelty is to attract attention to that which will compel interest. Unless this latter is present, there is no point in attracting attention.

The object of good craftsmanship is to make the most of the material.

The object of careful display is to bring the material to the notice of the right people.

The object of good letterpress is to direct the interest that has been aroused into the right channels.

These things are mere use of what the poster embodies. What it embodies should be a symbol or set of symbols. These are the means of arousing interest.

Unless the poster can arouse interest, artistic composition, novelty, craftsmanship, and display are worth nothing.

It is, of course, also true that a poster may make use of symbols in a very successful manner, and yet fail because it is not brought to the notice of the right people, or because it does not, after having aroused interest, direct it.

Quite recently, an excellent poster was widely displayed in London. An enquiry of a number of people showed that they had seen the poster, and were much impressed by it. The majority were, however, unable to say what commodity the poster advertised.

The letterpress was at fault. It should be possible to remedy this very easily.

Often the man who is most successful in choosing the matter for a poster—the actual execution apart—is the professional artist. Many business men

would like to meet with a picture that had the wide appeal of " Bubbles."

Sir John Millais did not paint " Bubbles " as an advertisement.

But because " Bubbles " is a symbol for so many people, the appeal of the picture was immediate. And it was possible, quite easily, to link the subject to soap of the particular brand that " Bubbles " was used to advertise.

Chapter XIX

IDENTIFICATION

QUITE a number of men have discovered in themselves some real or fancied resemblance to a famous person, living or dead, and have gone out of their way to heighten this resemblance. They may have adopted a certain mode of dress, a manner of speech, or a way of wearing the hair.

They act, not as if they were themselves, but as if they were someone else.

The person is sometimes a parent.

Everyone has met the man who says: "What was good enough for my father is good enough for me."

Often enough the conduct of such a man is blameless. His actions may be praiseworthy. But nevertheless he is shirking what is the obvious duty of every man—the duty of thinking out a line of conduct for himself.

We say that such a man is identifying himself with another.

The matter of identification is bound up with wishes, that are in great part unconscious, and that are not therefore fully understood by the man who identifies himself with another.

The origin of such an identification with the

father is to be found in the circumstances of the man's childhood. His father towered over him. His father seemed to be the greatest and wisest and richest and most important man in the universe. It was to his father that the child went for information, for pocket-money and for protection.

The child often expresses the wish, in words and in conduct, to be " like father."

He asks his mother : " When I am a man, shall I be like father ? "

The man, therefore, who is identifying himself with his father, is psychologically, in this respect, still at the stage of being a tiny child.

He is living the wish of " being like father."

There is a later stage in development, that every boy, in greater or less degree, passes through—generally between his tenth and fourteenth years. It is the stage of hero worship.

The hero he worships will vary widely in different cases, or even at different times in the same youth.

The hero may be Charlemagne or Charlie Chaplin, Napoleon or the school cricket captain, Sherlock Holmes or the local centre-forward.

In connection with these he repeats the wish to be " like them."

He studies their walk, their clothing, their manner of speech. He reads of them. He puts up pictures and photographs of them in his " den."

Sometimes they find a place in his daydreams or his dreams.

The grown man who spends his energies in identifying himself with another man—with a " hero "—is therefore still, in this respect at least,

in a stage through which he should have passed. In this respect he is not grown up, but is still fourteen years of age.

This is not to say that we cannot, in the lives of men who have become great in the best sense of the word, find material for imitation. But this is a different matter from imitating, in all respects, our " heroes."

Such identification often becomes pathological. It is common to find in the insane wards of mental hospitals men and women who imagine themselves the Virgin Mary or Jesus Christ, Queen Elizabeth or Napoleon.

A man is not behaving as a fully responsible being when he makes the rule of his conduct " What would George Washington have done ? " instead of " What ought I to do ? "

He is placing the onus of his actions upon George Washington—or upon his own conception of George Washington—in place of upon himself. He is evading the responsibility of a personal decision.

Robert Louis Stevenson says that at one period of his life he used to spend a great deal of time in imitating carefully the styles of a number of masters of the art of writing. But he never made the mistake of regarding somebody else's style as his own. He never identified himself with Shakespeare or Maupassant or Lamb.

What he did was to develop out of all this imitation an individual style of his own.

Something similar to this would seem to be the real purpose of the stage of hero-worship through which every developing boy passes.

He imitates many characters for a time, and as a result develops an individual character of his own. He should not attempt to annex another man's personality.

He should not attempt to foist the character of King Arthur upon himself.

The identifications that we see most commonly are apparently somewhat different from those that have already been mentioned. The difference is, however, merely an apparent one.

It has been noted by a great many people that some members of the audience of the cinema theatre reflect, in their faces, the expressions of the faces of the "stars" shown on the screen.

The outward expressions are indications of an inner feeling—of an emotion. Some of the spectators are going through an emotional experience that is appropriate to the scene before them. They are feeling exactly as if they were going through the experience that the actress is represented as going through.

They are, in short, identifying themselves with the "star."

The same thing is true of the spectators of a football match or some other spectacular display.

The great number of spectators neither play football nor wish to play it. They possess a knowledge of the game, that has come from frequent watching it. To some extent they are connoisseurs.

During the game great excitement prevails, particularly in the course of a piece of brilliant individual play. Some spectators register emotion, that can be easily read, in their faces. Some move

their bodies and their feet in sympathy with the players.

These things are well known. They are not discoveries of the psychologists. Clever sporting journalists, who are necessarily keen observers—Tom Webster is an excellent example—have known and utilised the facts for a long time.

These things indicate again that the spectator is identifying himself with the man he is watching. It explains why so many spectators admire spectacular play rather than sound play; why they prefer a " clever " player to a " good " player.

It is not suggested that all those who watch professional games are of this kind. Spectators fall into two well-marked classes—those who go to see a game, and those who go to witness a spectacle.

The first watch and judge the game exactly as they would judge anything else about which they possessed knowledge. The second go for the sake of the feelings aroused in themselves by the spectacle.

It is probably necessary, as a result of the conditions under which so many people live, and of the monotonous routine work in which they are condemned to spend their lives, that to some extent they should live in others. It seems to be their one chance of having splendid moments at all.

So they identify themselves with people who are doing dashing, spectacular things. And so—by proxy—they themselves do these things, and—also by proxy—receive applause and adulation. So they realise one of the earliest daydreams of the child—which is still their daydream, because it

represents a body of wishes that have never been gratified, and that never will be really gratified. Wishes, too, that are not conscious and are not understood.

Such identification explains a great part of the interest of members of a crowd.

There has always been a great deal of amusement expressed in regard to the meetings that take place in Hyde Park on Sundays, near the Marble Arch. At this place you may see speakers mounted on platforms which vary from an old packing-case to a portable desk, and hear them speaking on any subject, from the true form of the earth to political economy.

They invariably attract crowds.

Reference has already been made to the day-dream that is common with many men and women —the fantasy of addressing crowds that hang upon their words—the notion of "spell-binding."

In the crowds that gather there may be noticed three types of people—those who linger for amusement, those who really are impressed by the speaker and those who come to heckle.

The question of amusement, as distinct from pleasure, is a difficult one, lying beyond the scope of this book. We can do no more here than note that the man who is amused by another, in the way that men are amused by outdoor speakers, expresses by his amusement a conviction of superiority.

The man who heckles is endeavouring to oust the speaker from the position he occupies. The speaker is holding the attention of the audience—the heckler tries to distract it from him. The

speaker is dominating his audience—the heckler tries to overthrow him.

The man who is bound by the spell of the speaker is the man who is regarding him as the football spectator looks on his favourite centre-forward. He is identifying himself with the speaker; in and through him he is holding the attention of the crowd, through him wrestling with the heckler.

Each of these three persons thus enters into a personal relation with the speaker, that is characterised by feeling, in greater or less degree. The first man feels himself superior to the speaker, the second regards him as an antagonist or a rival, and the third regards him as himself.

There may be present a fourth type of person, who is looking objectively at the whole matter. He is listening to the speaker, weighing his statements, judging his utterances. He is present in order to gather information, or for some other purpose that is characterised by judgment and knowledge. He is not amused, nor antagonised, nor under a spell.

Contrasting him with the other men, we might say that he is thinking. They are feeling.

Crowd psychology is a very great subject. No attempt has been made to exhaust it in the present chapter. But, as will be seen, we cannot go far into the subject without encountering IDENTIFICATION.

The understanding of identification is the key to the understanding of many things connected with the behaviour of men, whether singly or in groups.

In every great man we have a tendency to behold ourselves. And when our sense of reality forces us to admit that there are differences, for these we can blame circumstances, or our parents, or the Government, or destiny, or even Providence.

There is no lack of recognised scapegoats.

We never need blame ourselves.

Chapter XX

MORE ABOUT IDENTIFICATION

IDENTIFICATION, as we have seen, is the clue to the fascination that spectacles possess for great numbers of people.

We have seen identification manifested in the spectators in a cinematograph theatre, of a football match, and in some of the auditors of a park speaker.

We may see it manifested equally amongst the people who line the streets and who crowd stands and fill windows on the occasion of a state procession. We may see it displayed unmistakably in the course of a theatrical or music-hall performance.

It would seem that the majority of men make use of a great many occasions that occur in everyday life, as opportunities for identifications.

Man seems always to be reaching out beyond his present achievement. But men differ in the ways in which they reach out.

Some progress step by step, keeping their aspirations in close relation to their possibilities.

Others have desires that must, from the very nature of things, remain ever unsatisfied. They take no practical steps whatever for the realisation of these wishes.

The former climb a stairway, step by step. The latter sit at the foot and cry for the moon.

The whole seems to depend upon the amount of interest that is directed outwards. If little, then there is a large residue that is seeking for expression.

If, on the other hand, the bulk of available interest has found expression, it will be released gradually, as one or more of these modes becomes mere routine.

If a man is doing work that, by continually presenting itself to him in fresh aspects, continually utilises interest, he is able to express himself in his work.

So soon, however, as work becomes mere routine and habit—so soon does interest seek other means of expression.

Dr. Myers has mentioned, in a little work that he has written on *Present Day Applications of Psychology*, that in a factory it was discovered that the output of girl workers was increased when their machines were painted in bright colours, and were marked with names, in place of the numbers that used to distinguish them.

It was a common practice of French field-gunners to mark their guns with names—with the names of women, as a rule. In this way they made the machines human, and so directed to them the interest that a human being claims from us.

The same sort of thing is done by locomotive drivers and by sailors and motorists. Continually we hear a locomotive or a ship or a motor-car spoken of as " she," " old girl," or some other term

—usually a feminine one—that indicates a desire on the part of the speaker to regard it as a human being, and to invest it with a great part of his interest.

Once, however, that the real world about us fails to hold our interest, the interest flows back from things to wishes.

The interest flows back to the daydream, in part.

The central figure of the daydream is always ourselves—not as we are, but as we would be. As we believe we should be, were it not for the force of circumstances that hold us back from the realisation of our desires.

The frantic reading of fiction that is so common with people who do not find real life interesting is not far removed from daydreaming.

The messenger boy, walking along the street, keeping close to the wall so that he shall not be jostled by passers-by, has lost practically all touch with the real world. For him time does not exist, his business has ceased to trouble him. He will be battling with cannibals, saving maidens from villains, ruling coral islands until he reaches the end of the instalment.

In the story he has discovered the means of identification with the hero he would wish to be.

Though we laugh at him—unless we have the misfortune to employ him—is he so very different from the girl at the seaside who lies on the sand and dreams over her Garvice novel? Or from ourselves, when we barricade ourselves in a "den" and in the comfort of our easiest chair become lost

to the world in the pages of a story that entrances us ?

It would seem that when an editor advertises a story of "strong human interest," he means a story that will provide the majority of the people for whom he caters with a means of identifying themselves with a fictive character.

The story will contain a central figure who realises the wishes—the unsatisfied and only partially conscious wishes—of his public. This figure will act and speak, not as they act and speak in real life, but as they do these things in their daydreams. And the world in which he moves will not be the humdrum world of chairs and tables, rent and gas-bills, taxes and timetables, but the world of the daydream.

The wide need of identification that is felt by so many people is being continually utilised in connection with publicity.

The immaculate man of the tailor's advertisements is the customer—again not as he is, but as he would be. He stands out distinctively from a background of expensively dressed men, of fashionable women, of beautiful horses—the material of a daydream world.

The smart man of the collar advertisement is again the beholder.

And the impetuous, dashing young man who rides the motor-cycle straight towards you—who is he ?

He is well-built, joyous and fearless.

Is not the whole purpose of the advertisement to make you say : "I should be exactly like that,

but for the fact that I have not a motor-cycle"? And if you are not dashing and fearless and joyous, are not these deficiencies due to the absence of the motor-cycle? At least there is the tendency to believe so. And so the first step towards the purchase has been taken.

The flapper who says, "The one thing that I want to make me completely happy is so-and-so," has already identified herself, we may be pretty certain, with someone who already possesses the article in question.

The possession of a duplicate is the one thing that is necessary to complete the identification.

After the results of a beauty competition have been published, and the portraits of the winners have appeared in the papers, it is possible to meet many girls, of about the same age as the entrants, who will say, "I should look like her, if I did my hair differently, or if I wore a blouse like hers."

It is not utility only that has made the Lenglen bandeau popular.

But it is not necessary to believe that all identification is futile.

We may find in the process the explanation of much that is called sympathy, attachment, or love.

The devoted patriot is a person who has made his country's good his own. The perfect friend is the man who has made his friend's good his own.

The most perfect moral law is contained in the precept: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour AS THYSELF."

There is a stage in the development of the child in which it is more self-centred than at any other

stage of a normal development. This is roughly included in the years between three and ten, and falls between the period which is most nearly animal and that in which the child shows marked hero-worship.

It is the stage in which the child becomes conscious of himself as a personality, apart from other personalities. He becomes aware of some of his deficiencies, as compared with the people who surround him. He estimates other people, too, and learns how to make use of them.

From this self-centred state he passes on to identify himself with other people.

The process may be looked upon as an extension of the personality.

He begins to regard his family as himself. He goes on to look upon his school in the same way—upon his church—upon his university—upon his business—upon his property—upon his country.

Only in this way can we account for the attitude—which we speak of as in the best sense a sentimental one, since the attitude is so characterised by strong feeling—towards the homeland, property, and the motherland.

Only great men can recognise and care for great things. The ignoble man cannot identify himself with such.

Very few men consciously make the naive remark of the French king : " L'état, c'est moi." Very few would say, as a man said only a few days since, that when he was sentenced to imprisonment, he heard the fabric of the British constitution cracking.

The effective identification is unconscious. It

is not the man who SAYS that the State is himself, but who FEELS it—without knowing what it is that he feels—who makes the sacrificing patriot. It is the man who identifies himself with the figure on the poster unconsciously—feeling something that he does not consciously understand—who buys the article.

It is upon such an unconscious identification with himself, it would appear, that a leader depends for the loyalty of his followers. These are joined to him, less by what they know of him than by what they feel towards him. For them he is a hero.

Every man's hero is the man he would be and could be—but for circumstance. It is the incarnation of all his wishes, conscious and unconscious, for himself.

In the final issue, then, every man's hero is himself.

Chapter XXI

PROJECTION

WE have spoken of the ways in which people identify themselves with others. It is necessary, if our survey of the relations between people is to be a complete outline, to look at another process of which we continually find examples.

We often hear an adverse criticism of one person made by another.

When we look at the critic himself, we are often reminded of the adage that suggests that we should carefully cast out the beam from our own eye before we make any attempt upon the mote that is in our neighbour's.

We are reminded of the proverb that says that people in glass houses should not throw stones.

Anybody who considers the matter will arrive at the conclusion that the bulk of the stone-throwing that goes on in the world is done by the people who live in glass houses.

Such a statement is impossible to prove. The existence of the proverb shows, however, that many generations of men have observed that people who live in glass houses DO throw stones.

One would imagine that the danger of the occupa-

tion would occur to them. We can only believe that they are blind to their own condition.

The blindness is interesting. We recognise it to some extent in our everyday language.

Burns asks in one of his poems for the power to see ourselves as others see us. We recognise that people are usually blind to their own faults.

We say that "love is blind," implying that prejudice will lead us to ignore the faults of those with whom we identify ourselves. To which saying Josh Billings has sagely added: "But some fellows can see twice as much in their girls as I can."

We are here dealing with a repression. Automatically the recognition of a lover's faults is banished from consciousness. The same thing is true of a great many of our own faults.

What is repressed, however, struggles for expression. It manifests itself as interest—in the thing that is repressed or in something that represents it. If what represents it is so disguised that we do not recognise it we may indulge the interest a good deal. But if there is any degree of recognition, then we feel uncomfortable.

It may be that a man is unbusinesslike and unpunctual. He struggles with the bad habits. He believes that he has mastered them. He has assumed an appearance of efficiency and punctuality that deceives himself, but very few other people.

Such a man hates very violently the appearance of unbusinesslikeness and unpunctuality in other people. He is not merely bothered by them, and annoyed by them as men are disturbed by the

upsetting of their arrangements by others—he "hates" them.

He tends to magnify a single instance of unpunctuality, and to regard the person who has through inadvertence once kept him waiting as a person who is habitually unpunctual.

For such men a single transgression makes a "thief" or a "liar."

One hears such a man say of the newspapers: "I never read them. They contain nothing but reports of divorce cases and crime. They are mere chronicles of impropriety."

Such a statement is simply not true of any newspaper. It can be controverted by the simple device of cutting up the paper. A sane critic might say that certain papers seemed to devote a great portion of their space to criminal reports.

The man who can find "nothing else," however, though he tells us little enough about the paper by his criticisms, tells us a great deal about himself. He has an overwhelming interest in crime and impropriety.

One often hears criticisms of the world that are similar. There are people who can see nothing but depravity and vice in the world. They betray thus, not a knowledge of the world, but their own interest in depravity and vice.

This interest can be indulged, once it can be given an appearance of virtue. One may become a militant puritan. One may associate oneself with all manner of futile but savage and repressive measures against the depravity that is supposed to be so universal.

In this interest in repressive legislation we can see the best example, perhaps, of projection. The struggle that is going on in one's own personality is transferred to the outer world.

The dragons that are seen in the outer world are those that are dwelling within. A man's foes are those of his own personality.

There are extreme stages, in which delusions are present. We know that the pink rats of the drunkard are not in the outer world, but are due to the poison in his brain.

There are extreme stages of projection, in which the deluded person ascribes intent to murder him to all those about him. He sees an enemy in everyone who approaches him.

These are, however, not normal. But they are exaggerations of the normal, through which we may better understand the normal.

The normal man who projects an inner struggle on the world does so with some justification. In the case of the militant puritan, we have to acknowledge that he is right in his claim that there is a great deal of vice in the world. What we say is that he sees it disproportionately.

It is as if his interest shone on vice as a searchlight beam would do, illuminating it with a disproportionate intensity, whilst all besides remains in obscurity.

Latterly there has been a good deal written in the papers on the subject of drugs. There have been deaths that have been caused by, or connected with, the taking of cocaine or morphia.

So soon as such a case is reported in the papers,

there follow the usual letters asking why the Government does nothing; why people who sell drugs are not flogged; why larger penalties are not inflicted—and so on.

It is quite useless to point out that none of these measures are practical. The tone of the letters themselves is generally sufficient to show that they are not written by practical people.

Frequently a sane, calm article on the subject appears. Lately there have been many such in the newspapers. The contrast of their tone with that of many of the letters is very marked.

The letters again prove, unintentionally, that there exists, on the part of many people who do not take drugs at all, a great interest in them.

It is not easy, perhaps, to explain at all fully the reasons of such an interest. These must necessarily vary with the individual.

But the whole purpose of taking drugs is to deaden inner conflicts, which are not always recognised as such. The repressing forces are paralysed, so that the unconscious wishes may express themselves more freely than is usual. The man under the influence of drugs is able to do and think and feel things that he would not in ordinary circumstances permit himself to do or think or feel.

Such a man is "FREE." He has, for the time being, not a care in the world.

There are after-effects, of course. The forces do not remain for ever paralysed. They recover, and repression begins all over again. It is as if, in place of turning out an intruder and keeping him

out, one were to let him in again and again, and, after each admission, once more turn him out.

This fierce struggle is one of the inevitable after-effects of the drug. There are physiological after-effects, also, but these it is not our business to discuss.

But drugs stand for a short cut to a delusive "freedom"—a freedom from those inner struggles which make up our "cares."

Short cuts are tempting. It is only experience that teaches us to distrust them.

The man who most fears and hates drugs, who most wishes to suppress their sale and use by violent, savage and utterly unpractical measures, is the man for whom they are a temptation.

He is the man who is in the throes of a violent internal struggle, who is obsessed by "cares," who longs for an inner freedom, and for whom all "short cuts" are a standing temptation.

We may realise that the use of alcohol and drugs costs the country very heavily for the upkeep of prisons and asylums and hospitals. We may realise that alcohol has an effect on the health of masses of people, and that its use affects the incidence of venereal disease. We may realise that in the end we have to pay for these things. And we may—as we reflect on the number of things for which we have to pay at the moment—regard alcohol and drugs as somewhat of a nuisance, and wish for constructive methods of dealing with the evils connected with them.

All our considerations, however, do not have the effect of making us fanatics, or even total abstainers.

They have not had the effect, in this country, of making us adopt extreme measures, of whose success we are by no means assured.

We are told that prohibition will certainly be enforced in Great Britain within a few years. It is possible to keep an open mind on the question at present. But we can be assured that the issue will rest upon the success that the measure secures in practice.

The reports of visitors to the United States afford an amusing instance of projection. Some visitors see more drunkenness than ever before as a result of prohibition. Others see nothing but sobriety, efficiency and satisfaction with the way in which prohibition is working out.

It would hardly be possible to find a more convincing illustration of the fact that we see with our wishes and not with our eyes.

And every observer assures us, in the preface to his statement, that he is absolutely impartial.

Just as, of course, everybody who has ever taken a patent medicine, and been cured by it, finds it necessary to tell us, in his unsolicited testimonial, that he took the medicine with no belief that it would cure him.

He leaves us to infer that he took it to pass the time, or for amusement, or because he thought that druggists ought to be encouraged.

In both identification and projection, therefore, we find ourselves dealing with wishes rather than with facts. There is an old rhyme which says that "If wishes were horses, then beggars could ride." Wishes are much more powerful than horses.

Wishes are the expression of interest. This interest may be conscious, and we know its expression as desire.

It may be unconscious. We are committed to the use of the paradoxical expression, "unconscious wishes." We are not aware of these, but they move us, all the same, to actions regarding which we feel strongly . . . which we do not understand, and which we cannot explain.

We can only excuse them.

EPILOGUE

THIS is the end of this little book.

It is not the end, however, of the study of the mind. It is but the mere beginning.

The study of the mind has one great advantage over many other sciences. It needs no expensive materials or apparatus. It calls for no extensively equipped laboratory.

The material exists in the observer and in his fellows. To some extent every man is a psychologist.

Therein lie certain difficulties and pitfalls.

Many men have, at different times, envied a Lyons' waitress her memory. But the waitress can tell you very little about her memory—how she remembers and why—where her memory succeeds and where it fails. She takes her memory for granted.

All of us, in the same way, take many of the facts of our own minds for granted.

We are inclined to say that they are " natural," and to leave them so.

But in the effort to understand a thing that everybody has always taken for granted we are likely to stumble across discoveries. Newton refused to take the falling of an apple as not requiring explanation because it was so " natural." Franklin refused to take lightning for granted.

The other great difficulty to be overcome is that of bias. It is difficult to examine anything connected with ourselves cold-bloodedly. Otherwise we shall seek to excuse rather than to explain.

To recognise these difficulties is in great measure to overcome them.

All the activities of man may be regarded as resulting from the outflow of interest—either the direct interest in the thing itself, or in something that is definitely bound up with it. A man is either interested in his job, or in the honour or profit of it.

Without an outgoing of interest, life, as we understand it, would come to an end.

There are to be found in asylums patients who sit, brooding, all day long. Nothing that goes on around them appeals to them in the slightest degree. Their behaviour is an exaggeration of that of the person who is absorbed in a "brown study."

All their interest is directed inwards.

We seem to develop habits in order to leave our interest free to find other outlets. For it is of the essence of man that his interest shall go on to farther and farther goals. His feet are on the earth, but his fingers reach out towards the stars.

Of the ways in which interest is generated within us, we know nothing. One theory would appear to regard it as a fixed quantity, a capital that we expend during our lives. Another would regard it as something universal, that flows into us, as water flows from the hills into the reservoirs that we construct . . . These are fascinating speculations,

but they have at present no value that is immediately practical.

But we do know that we influence and control others by influencing their interest; by directing its flow. But before we can do this we have to know something of the rules according to which it flows: otherwise our results will be haphazard. We shall be unable to understand or to profit by our failures.

The increasing complexity of our own lives—what we speak of as our development—is due to the increasing complexity of the paths along which our interest flows.

A comparison may be made at this point with the road system of a country. In the first place, a few paths or tracks existed, determined by the natural features of the land. Later, men increased the number of these, linking them together, broadening some, neglecting others.

We may compare the simple gratifying of instincts to these first simple roadways. We possess instincts—certain easy paths of action—because we are men, and because such instinctive activities are "natural" to men. That is not a very satisfactory conclusion; but it seems to be as far as we can go at present.

The individual circumstances of our lives compel us to find outlets that differ in some respects from those of other men. These are the new paths.

As time goes on, the older roads fall partly into disuse, in some cases. In others they are trodden very much and broadened. Some of the new paths soon fall into disuse, also; whilst others are pushed out farther and farther towards distant goals.

So in the case of an active man, the system of outlets for his interest becomes like the complex road system.

The archæologist is able to discover, even now, the old cattle ways of the ancient inhabitants of Britain and the later Roman roads; even though some of them are grass-grown and scarcely discernible from the downlands over which they pass; even though others have been broadened and hidden under macadam and tar. In just the same way, it is possible to discern in all the complex activities of modern man, the old instinctive tracks.

Just as the complexities of a modern system of communications can hardly be understood without some understanding of the natural features of the land and the more ancient and simple tracks, so it is hardly possible to understand the behaviour of the adult without some preliminary grasp of the simpler understructure of his mental makeup.

This is the reason why, in this book, an attempt has been made to outline very briefly the main facts about this substructure, as they are understood at the present day, and to relate these to the facts of behaviour as they come under our notice in daily life. . . . The whole resembles a rough sketch of the Roman roadways of Great Britain, with indications of their relation to the main motor roads and railways.

No attempt has been made to say "all" about anything. Least of all, to say "all" about the human mind.

In the first place, the "all" could not be said in a single book.

In the second, nobody could say the "all." In spite of the fact that man was the first thing in which man was interested, he probably still knows less of the nature of man than of anything else in existence.

But, since "the proper study of mankind is man," we shall still go on studying him in the hope that finally we may know "all" about him.

Meanwhile, there is something known, that must be understood as a prelude to something more. . . . And even for those who are not greatly interested in adding to what is known, the present knowledge can be of great interest—and certainly of practical use.

To suggest that this is so has been the whole object of this book, which has been written in the belief that the study of the mind, in the light of modern knowledge, is well worth while, even to those who regard themselves as eminently practical men, for whom speculative enquiries have little or no attraction.

For those who have been sufficiently interested —or convinced—to believe that the matter is worth following up, there is now no lack of good books on the subject

It has been extraordinarily interesting to write this book.

The hope may be expressed that it will not be less interesting to read it.

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